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WHAT’S LOVE GOT TO DO WITH IT? A PROPOSAL FOR ELEVATING
THE STATUS OF MARRIAGE BY NARROWING ITS DEFINITION, WHILE
UNIVERSALLY EXTENDING THE RIGHTS AND BENEFITS ENJOYED BY
MARRIED COUPLES
JAMES L. MUSSELMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Much has been written in recent years regarding marriage and its place in
modern society. Articles have been published advocating the expansion of
marriage to include same-sex couples,1 the abolition of government-regulated
marriage,2 and condemning the “withering away” of marriage and all it
represents.3 Authors have proposed replacing the legal status of marriage with
a new status bearing different nomenclature, such as “domestic limited
partnership,” and have suggested creating different rules, rights and obligations
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to Martha is the model and the inspiration for the traditional covenant marriage option proposed in
this article.
1. See, e.g., Tobin A. Sparling, All in the Family: Recognizing the Unifying Potential of Same-Sex
Marriage, 10 LAW & SEXUALITY 187 (2001); John G. Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments Against Same-Sex
Marriage, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1119 (1999).
2. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, A “Judeo-Christian” Argument for Privatizing Marriage, 27 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1221 (2006); Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case for Abolishing
Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161 (2006). But see Nancy J. Knauer, A Marriage Skeptic Responds
to the Pro-Marriage Proposals to Abolish Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1261 (2006) (expressing
concern that deregulation of marriage would simply give rise to other issues regarding legal
recognition of same-sex relationships); Carol Sanger, A Case for Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
1311 (2006) (expressing concern that contract law, by itself, is not capable of sufficiently regulating
marriage); Dr. Charles J. Reid, Jr., And the State Makes Three: Should the State Retain a Role in
Recognizing Marriage?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1277 (2006) (arguing that, for a variety of reasons, the
state is in the best position to regulate marriage).
3. See Lynn D. Wardle, The “Withering Away” of Marriage: Some Lessons from the Bolshevik Family
Law Reforms in Russia, 1917–1926, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 469 (2004).
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than those currently pertaining to the status of marriage.4 Others have proposed
the creation of a new status for same-sex couples, which roughly parallels the
rules, rights and obligations currently applicable to married couples, and would
exist alongside the current legal status of marriage.5 The legislatures of several
states have taken varying positions on these issues. While some states have
created a separate “civil union” status, others have expanded the traditional
definition of marriage or explored the idea of “covenant marriage.” For
example, the Vermont legislature created the status of “civil union” that confers
the same benefits enjoyed by married couples on same-sex couples who choose
it.6 Additionally, the Massachusetts and California legislatures have been
directed by the highest courts in those states to redefine marriage to include
same-sex couples.7 Conversely, many state legislatures have taken the opposite
view, defining marriage restrictively as a union between one man and one
woman.8 In three states, the legislature created a separate form of marriage—
termed “covenant marriage”—a purely elective status available only to
different-sex couples and creating stringent requirements for both entry and
exit.9
Against this backdrop, the marriage debate rages on; each side equally
convinced of the merits of its arguments and making them vigorously with
legal, ethical, moral and religious overtones. Apparently, it is not possible for
states to reach a consensus regarding a universal definition of a legally
recognized relationship that would replace the current status of marriage. At
the same time, each side appears woefully unhappy with the status quo. One
side desires an expansive definition of marriage whereas the other desires a
more restrictive definition, like those currently governing most jurisdictions.
Some in the more restrictive camp also desire mandatory requirements for
entering and exiting the marriage relationship.
Some very compelling (and some not so compelling) arguments have been
advanced on each side of the debate. It is painfully obvious that whether the

4. See, e.g., Jennifer A. Drobac & Antony Page, A Uniform Domestic Partnership Act: Marrying
Business Partnership and Family Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 349 (2007) (proposing a domestic partnership
model based on business partnership law as a substitute for civil marriage).
5. See, e.g., Greg Johnson, Civil Union, a Reappraisal, 30 VT. L. REV. 891, 891 (2006) (suggesting
that couples could be given the right to choose their form of legally recognized relationship from
several options, including domestic partnership and civil union).
6. See William C. Duncan, Whither Marriage in the Law, 15 REGENT U.L. REV. 119, 123–24 (2003).
7. See Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Religion, Polygamy, and Non-Traditional Families: Disparate Views
on the Evolution of Marriage in History and in the Debate Over Same-Sex Unions, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
19, 20 (2007) (stating that Goodridge was the first decision by the highest court of any state to
constitutionally recognize the right of same-sex couples to marry); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d
384, 402 (Cal. 2008) (concluding that the California statutory provisions that limit marriage to
opposite-sex couples violate the California Constitution); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (ruling that barring same-sex couples from the protections, benefits and
obligations of civil marriage violates the Massachussetts Constitution).
8. See Duncan, supra note 6, at 120 (describing the process by which constitutional
amendments in Alaska and Hawaii were enacted to restrict the definition of marriage to oppositesex couples).
9. Covenant marriage laws have so far been enacted in Louisiana, Arizona and Arkansas. Id.
at 121–22.
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status of marriage is modified or remains the same, a substantial number of
people will be unhappy and feel that their personal morals, ethics and beliefs
have been violently offended. If a consensus of any kind is to be reached, it must
satisfy the most compelling arguments made by each side. How is that possible
when the positions of the two camps are so polarized? The solution must
provide for more than one legally recognized relationship that couples may
enter, each offering the same rights and benefits but with different requirements.
This article proposes an approach that defines two legally recognized
relationships. First, opposite-sex couples desiring a traditional marriage could
choose the option that generally adopts portions of the covenant marriage law
enacted thus far by three states. Second, all couples, whether same-sex or
opposite-sex, could choose the option most similar to today’s current marriage
relationship.
Part II of this article discusses the general history of the marriage concept.
Marriage has historically taken different forms and has had varying degrees of
importance over time and with respect to different groups. Part III addresses
some of the criticisms levied against the current state of marriage, and the
responses to such criticisms. Part III.A discusses the view that marriage has
become much too liberalized and inclusive therefore losing much of its original
meaning and importance. This liberalization has been described as a “withering
away” of marriage, much to the peril of society. As explained in Part III.B, one
response to that view has been the enactment of covenant marriage laws. Part
IV advocates an expansive view of marriage that would include same-sex
couples and further explains some of the arguments advanced on both sides of
that debate. Part IV also discusses the proposals offered to resolve that debate.
Part V explains in more detail the need for a multi-faceted approach, and fleshes
out the proposal described above.
II. THE HISTORY AND ORIGINS OF MARRIAGE
In telling the creation story, the Bible describes how woman was made
from the rib of man and states that “[f]or this reason a man will leave his father
and mother and be united to his wife, and they will become one flesh.”10 This
statement implies that such unity, or marriage, shall be between one woman and
one man.11 Yet history reveals that marriage has taken many different forms
and has assumed varying degrees of importance in different cultures.12 There
are many biblical examples of marriages not following the one man to one
woman implication of Genesis. One famous example is King Solomon, who had
700 wives.13

10. Genesis 2:24. All citations to the Bible are to the New International Version.
11. See Matthew 19:4–5 (quoting Jesus Christ, in referencing the creation story, that “man and
wife” meant a male and a female).
12. See Wardle, supra note 3, at 469 (citing JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT:
MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN WESTERN TRADITION 2–3, 194 (1997) (discussing five models of
marriage in Western Christian tradition); MARY ANN GLENDON, STATE, LAW AND FAMILY: FAMILY
LAW IN TRANSITION IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 7–14 (1977) (discussing alternative
forms of marriage regulation and different meanings of marriage).
13. See 1 Kings 11:3.
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Commentators differ regarding the historical importance of marriage in
early Christianity. According to Professors Jennifer Drobac and Antony Page,
“[b]efore the late eighteenth century, marriage typically only served one or more
of three goals: (1) to consolidate wealth and resources, (2) to forge political
alliances, and (3) to consummate peace treaties.”14 As for Christianity’s role, the
authors assert that “[m]arriage was not originally a Christian religious
institution. During its first thousand years, the Catholic Church did not
consider marriage a sacrament and weddings were not celebrated in
churches.”15 Professor Daniel Crane provides substantial historical support for
the proposition that the Catholic Church’s modern view of marriage as a
Christian sacrament—like baptism and the Eucharist—began to emerge early in
church history and was theologically formalized at least by the Middle Ages.16
Professor Crane also discusses various early, prominent, Protestant authorities
on marriage who state “it is possible to locate a distinctive Protestant tradition
that is both ambivalent toward the sacramental understanding of marriage yet
insistent that marriage remains a spiritual institution.”17
Professors Drobac and Page point out that American law, consistent with
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, has never recognized marriage as
a sacrament or other religious construct. The law recognizes marriage only as a
civil contract.18 Although marriage remains an extraordinarily important
religious concept, religious leaders who perform marriages are authorized to do
so by local law and are charged with verifying the satisfaction of civil marriage
license requirements.19 In that regard, governmental regulation of marriage is
entirely secular. Nevertheless, the concept of marriage adopted and approved
for regulation is “based on religious tradition and the English common law: . . .
lifelong, monogamous, Christian marriage.”20
In its early form adopted from the English common law, marriage in
America “was a strongly hierarchical relationship. Under the system of
coverture, a married woman’s legal and economic identity merged into her
husband’s.”21 In other words, the husband was in total, legal control of the
marital relationship and any property produced during the marriage. As the
Texas Supreme Court succinctly stated, “[a]t common law, the husband and
wife were one, and the husband was that one.”22 This model remained in place,
virtually untouched for about two centuries; indeed, it persevered despite

14. Drobac & Page, supra note 4, at 357 (citing EVAN WOLFSON, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS:
AMERICA, EQUALITY, AND GAY PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO MARRY 7, 104 (2004)).
15. Drobac & Page, supra note 4, at 357.
16. Crane, supra note 2, at 1229–33.
17. Id. at 1237.
18. Drobac & Page, supra note 4, at 357 (citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVES:
FAMILIES, INDIVIDUALS AND THE LAW 7 (2004)).
19. Drobac & Page, supra note 4, at 357–58.
20. Ann Laquer Estin, Marriage and Belonging, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1690, 1691 (reviewing NANCY F.
COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2000)).
21. Id. at 1692.
22. Few v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 463 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. 1971).
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“[w]omen receiv[ing] the right to vote in 1920 and gain[ing] greater citizenship
and nationality rights in the decades that followed.”23
Sweeping changes began to occur in the latter half of the twentieth century.
In her book, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation, Nancy Cott
identified the decade of the Second World War as an important turning point
regarding the traditional model of marriage.24 “During the 1940’s, the Supreme
Court abandoned its hostility toward migratory divorce, and the American Bar
Association recommended moving to a no-fault principle in divorce.”25 As a
result, fault was eliminated as a prerequisite for divorce.26 Eventually the
concept of the husband being in total control of the marital relationship and the
marital property began to give way to a model of equal rights for both spouses.
For example, Texas, a community property state, amended its constitution in
1972 to ensure equal rights between the sexes27 and subsequently enacted laws
equalizing the marital property rights of both spouses.28 In the common law
property states, the concept of coverture gave way to a system that essentially
gave the spouses equitable rights of distribution upon dissolution of the
marriage.29
III. WHAT HAS GONE WRONG WITH MARRIAGE? DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES
A. Is Marriage “Withering Away”?
There is no question that the elimination of fault as a prerequisite for
divorce has fundamentally changed the concept of marriage. Rather, the
difference of opinion lies in whether marriage has changed for better or worse.
As states began enacting no-fault divorce laws, the prevalence of divorce
increased dramatically. Professor Allen Parkman cites to statistics reflecting that
the annual national divorce rate was approximately ten per 1,000 women fifteen
years and older for most of the 1950’s and into the 1960’s, but rose steadily after
1964 until 1979, when it peaked at 22.8.30 After 1979, the divorce rate plateaued
and in 1996, the last year for which we have reliable national data, the divorce
rate was 19.5.31 It has recently been estimated that nearly half of all marriages in
America will end in divorce.32
Professor Parkman asserts that significant keys “to a successful marriage
are sacrifices on behalf of the relationship, the expectation of reciprocity by the
other family members, and a commitment by both spouses to their
23. Estin, supra note 20, at 1697.
24. Id. at 1697.
25. Id.
26. Drobac & Page, supra note 4, at 361.
27. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a.
28. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
29. Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 220 (1982).
30. Allen M. Parkman, The Contractual Alternative To Marriage, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 125, 125 (2005)
(citing U.S. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, 43 MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REPORT 9, tbl. 1
(1995)).
31. Id.
32. Wardle, supra note 3, at 498.
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relationship.”33 He argues that no-fault divorce laws “create perverse incentives
that discourage people from taking the steps necessary to make their marriages
a success”34 by inadequately compensating spouses for sacrifices made during
marriage. Instead, spouses are encouraged to make decisions during marriage
that benefit themselves at the expense of the family.35 Professors Eric Rasmusen
and Jeffrey Stake elaborate on this notion:
[T]he legal reforms radically changed the incentives married persons
confronted. With no assurance that a marriage would continue and no security
for either party in the judicially determined terms of divorce, the parties to a
marriage remained nearly as financially insecure after marriage as they had
been when single. Spreading of financial losses within the marital unit could no
longer be relied upon when one spouse had the option to bail out of a
household in difficulty. Devoting time and energy to producing assets useful to
the marriage became riskier. A career became a safer bet for either party.
People across the country responded to those new incentives, spending more
time at the office and less at home.36

Professors Drobac and Page list four principle goals that married couples
hope to achieve: to “(1) demonstrate love and commitment, both to each other
and in the eyes of the community; (2) secure the parentage and welfare of their
children; (3) create an efficient and unified domestic economic enterprise; and
(4) obtain legal rights and benefits based on their marital status.”37 They assert
that the free availability of unilateral no-fault divorce thwarts all four of these
goals: (1) spouses are motivated to protect themselves financially by spending
more time at work at the price of demonstrating less love and commitment to
each other and to their marriage; (2) children suffer as a result of divorce due to
adverse financial consequences, and experience more behavioral, emotional,
health and academic problems than do children whose parents have not
divorced; (3) an efficient and unified domestic economic enterprise is difficult to
create when spouses cannot be confident that the marriage will survive no
matter how much time and energy they devote to it; and (4) the legal rights and
benefits of marriage can obviously not be obtained if the marriage ends in
divorce.38
Professor Katherine Shaw Spaht argues that no-fault divorce is only one of
many avenues in which the law has retreated from the regulation of marriage.
This retreat has resulted in allowing the spouses not only to decide when to
divorce but also “to enter the relationship of marriage without the information
that used to be required, to define the content of their marriage and to determine
its day-to-day regulation.”39 Professor Spaht further asserts that the practical

33. Parkman, supra note 30, at 126.
34. Id. at 127.
35. Id.
36. Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage
Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 459 (1998).
37. Drobac & Page, supra note 4, at 352–53 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95–96 (1987)).
38. Id. at 362–64.
39. Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Last One Hundred Years: The Incredible Retreat of Law from the
Regulation of Marriage, 63 LA. L. REV. 243, 243–44 (2003).

MUSSELMAN__FMT1.DOC

1/21/2009 12:41:44 PM

WHAT’S LOVE GOT TO DO WITH IT?

43

result of the law’s retreat from marriage regulation is that “people in Western
countries have concluded that marriage is a private relationship which the law
has no right to regulate and whose consequences affect only the parties to the
marriage, not the general public, not even their own children.”40 Accordingly,
“abandonment by law of the regulation of marriage played a significant role in
changing society’s understanding of marriage and its public character.”41 She
concludes that
[w]hat our law . . . teaches about marriage needs revision desperately—a
revision that reinvigorates, strengthens, and protects the most fundamental of
human institutions. The need for reinvigoration in law of the traditional
understanding of marriage is pressing; it may be the only way Americans can
resist other ideas inimical to and destructive of the institution of marriage.42

Other commentators have adopted a contrary position, heralding the
establishment of no-fault divorce as a much needed progressive reformation of
family law. For example, Professor Cynthia VanSickle observes that prior to the
advent of no-fault divorce unhappy couples desiring a divorce were often forced
to fabricate fault.43 This often resulted in collusion between the parties wherein
one spouse agreed to take full responsibility for the breakdown of the marriage
to facilitate obtaining a divorce.44 Professor VanSickle asserts that
[t]he change from fault to no-fault forced women to become better educated,
more marketable, and consequently, more financially independent. To revert to
a traditional, fault-based divorce system would encourage women to resume
traditional gender roles, which emphasize the financial dependence of women
on their spouses. Further, it also stands to reason that any financial hardship or
dependence incurred by a woman in marriage and divorce would also be felt by
the children of the marriage.45

Professor VanSickle concludes that “eliminating the no-fault provision
from divorce actions is indeed a throwback to the pre-Civil Rights movement
that serves to stratify gender roles and return them to the status quo of the preWorld War II United States.”46
As the national divorce rate rose due to either the factors described above
or for other reasons altogether, men and women were increasingly deciding to
delay or reject marriage.47 From 1950 to 2002, the median age of first marriages
rose significantly, from 22.8 years for men and 20.3 years for women, to 26.9 for
men and 25.3 for women.48 A number of couples delaying marriage choose to
40. Id. at 244.
41. Id. at 247.
42. Id. at 306.
43. Cynthia M. VanSickle, A Return to the Anti-Feminist Past of Divorce Law: The Implications of the
Covenant or Marriage Laws as Applied to Women, 6 J. L. SOCIETY 154, 158 (2005).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 159.
46. Id. at 178.
47. Parkman, supra note 30, at 125.
48. Id. at 125 (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC SUPPLEMENT TO THE MARCH
2002 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, Series P20-547, available at
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/tabMS-2.xls).
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cohabitate. According to the 2000 Census, “the number of unmarried couples
living together increased by more than 70% between 1990 and 2000.”49 Professor
Lynn Wardle reported at the time of his article that about 5% of all American
households are comprised of nonmarital cohabitants, up from 3% a decade
previously, and that “[a]pproximately half of all persons who marry have
cohabited prior to marriage.”50 In addition, the success rate of cohabitating
unmarried couples is much worse than that of marriages; approximately 90% of
cohabitating unmarried couples end their relationship within the first five
years.51
Collectively, the higher median age of first marriages for both men and
women and the elevated divorce rate for those who do marry contributes
significantly to the increasing percentage of unmarried heads of household. In
2004, almost 50% of heads of households were not married, up from almost 45%
in 1990.52 The percentage is higher yet in African American families; in 2000, it
was estimated that only 48% of such families were headed by married couples.53
Those factors also contribute significantly to the increasing number of children
born to unmarried mothers. Professors Drobac and Page observe that, “[i]n
2002, a record 34% of births were by unwed women. More than twice as many
unmarried African American women gave birth than married African American
women did. The percentage of births to unmarried mothers for all races has
almost doubled since 1980, when the rate was 18.4%.”54 Indeed, Professor Spaht
also argues that “[n]o longer does the general public intuit that the married
couple is the instrumentality charged with civilization’s most burdensome, timeconsuming but indispensable task, the acculturation of children.”55
Professor Lynn Wardle devoted an entire article to the “withering away” of
marriage. He described the official state effort in Russia during the two decades
following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, which radically transformed and
de-privileged the institution of marriage, and compared it to developments in
contemporary American law.56 The Russian attempt to promote the “withering
away” of marriage was based on socialist ideology holding the state
economically responsible for all its members and thus eliminating the need for
marriage or family.57 Professor Wardle provided the following summary of the
Bolshevik experiment:
Within two months of the October 1917 Revolution, the government drastically
liberalized divorce, allowing divorce without grounds, either by mutual consent
or upon unilateral request. The same decree mandated civil registration of
marriage and abolished legal recognition of future religious marriages. In 1918
those reforms were codified in a new Family Law Code that mingled some

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Wardle, supra note 3, at 498.
Id.
Drobac & Page, supra note 4, at 352 n.9.
Id. at 352 nn.4–5.
Id. at 352 n.7.
Id. at 365 (footnotes omitted).
Spaht, supra note 39, at 244.
See generally Wardle, supra note 3.
Id. at 447.
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progressive provisions (such as joint property ownership and division) with
other more radical provisions. The 1918 Code also legally abolished illegitimacy
and adoption. In 1920, another national decree legalized state-funded abortionon-demand. Finally, in 1926, a new Family Law Code was adopted that further
liberalized divorce by entirely eliminating judicial review for mutual divorces,
and allowing unilateral divorce through simple process—essentially postcard
divorce. And since form was deemed irrelevant, if not a capitalist tool, and
informal liaisons were considered as legitimate as marriage, the 1926 Code also
extended full marital status and benefits to de facto couples.58

The Bolshevik experiment, forcing the “withering” of marriage and family,
failed miserably.59 Professor Wardle quoted an authority on Soviet social
history, as follows:
“Soviet social reconstruction was paid for in the coin of individual suffering and
broken families.” For some subgroups of Russian society, especially some
“peasants, family life often simply ceased to exist.” After the Revolution,
“moral decline and psychological excesses developed which ‘further deepened
the disorganization of the family . . . and [created] economic hardships,’ and in
marital family relations” reduced the family to a condition lower than had
“existed in Tsarist Russia.”60

Because divorce became so easy to accomplish, the divorce rate rose
rapidly. In most cases, women continued to be responsible for supporting the
children, yet received little, if any child support or alimony.61 Men began
changing wives regularly, with some men marrying more than twenty women.62
Abandonment, coerced divorce, blackmail and extortion became more
prevalent.63 Abortions became more commonplace, and the number of
abandoned street children increased significantly.64 “Children were the most
tragic and numerous victims of the new family order.”65
In an insightful comparison of the Bolshevik experiment with
developments in American family law and society, Professor Wardle concludes
that “[t]he same social practices . . . embraced by Russian revolutionary society
[in] 1917 seem to have been accepted and normalized in American society at the
turn of the millennium,”66 and “[t]he same legal policy elements that combined
to create the radical Bolshevik family law reforms seem to have emerged in the
family policies of the American nation and/or the family law regulations of the
American states.”67 The similarities between the Bolshevik experiment and
American family law reform are unmistakable: divorce in America, as in the
Bolshevik regime, has become extremely liberalized by the adoption of

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 473 (footnotes omitted).
Id.
Id. at 490–91 (quoting H. KENT GEIGER, THE FAMILY IN SOVIET RUSSIA (1968)).
Id. at 491.
Id. at 492.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 497.
Id.
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unilateral no-fault divorce laws;68 bearing children outside of marriage has
become commonly accepted and is no longer subject to legal or social stigma;69
and the United States Supreme Court has legalized abortion..70
Professor Wardle asserts that “[i]n some ways, American family policymakers have gone far beyond the Russian Bolsheviks with regard to elevating
extra-marital sexual relations and giving marital status to nonmarital
cohabitants.”71 In Lawrence v. Texas,72 the Supreme Court recognized “the right
of adults to enter personal sexual relationships as part of an unwritten
fundamental ‘right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life.’”73 In 2000, the American Law
Institute recommended family law reforms that provided for the recognition of
nonmarital domestic partnerships for all couples, whether same-sex or differentsex, and extended the same economic benefits accorded to married couples
when they divorce.74 Professor Wardle argues that these reforms “manifest that
the mainstream of elite leaders of the bench and bar consider nonmarital
relationships to be functionally equivalent to marriage in all significant respects
relevant to any public policy in family law.”75 In addition, legislation has been
adopted in several states legalizing in various ways relationships of same-sex
couples, and extending marriage or marriage-like status to them.76 Professor
Wardle asserts that, as a result, “[t]here is a strong, growing legal and social
trend in the United States to extend marital status and benefits to nonmarital
relations that is similar to if not more extreme than the policies adopted by the
Russian Bolsheviks in the decade after the 1917 Revolution.”77
B. A Response: Covenant Marriage
To combat the perceived deterioration of the traditional concept of
marriage as a union of one man and one woman intended to be indissoluble
until death, some state legislatures considered establishing an alternate form of
marriage that couples could choose rather than the default form already in
existence. Legislation was unsuccessfully introduced in several states to enact
“covenant marriage” laws.78 These laws embraced the concept of so-called

68. Id.
69. Id. at 500.
70. Id. at 501.
71. Id. at 502.
72. 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003).
73. Id. (footnotes omitted).
74. Wardle, supra note 3, at 504.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 504–05.
77. Id. at 505. In addition to the legal reforms described above, Professor Wardle identifies
several ideological elements that have contributed to the “withering away” of marriage. For
example, he cites extensively to feminist and gay legal scholars who advocate abolishing marriage as
a legal institution, and replacing it with legal concepts that govern other types of interactions and
relationships between individuals, such as contract and property law. He states that “[f]eminist
scholars have long criticized marriage as a repressive and oppressive institution.” Id. at 508.
78. See Joel A. Nichols, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage Law: A First Step Toward a More Robust
Pluralism in Marriage and Divorce Law?, 47 EMORY L.J. 929, 943–44 (1998) (stating that covenant
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“supervows”—legally cognizable premarital contracts in which couples make
marital commitments beyond those required by law.79 Adoption of a covenant
marriage law established the novel concept of a two-tiered marriage system in
the adopting state.
In Louisiana, state representative Tony Perkins was interested in legislation
that would strengthen families and joined forces with Professor Katherine Shaw
Spaht, of Louisiana State University, to draft a covenant marriage law to be
introduced in the Louisiana legislature.80 The law’s stated purpose was to act as
“an antidote to the high rates of divorce and as a proactive measure to bolster
the institution of marriage.”81 The law was eventually enacted and became fully
effective in 1997.82 Subsequently, Arizona in 1998 and Arkansas in 2001 enacted
covenant marriage laws that are substantially similar to Louisiana’s.83 All
require that a couple desiring to marry make a choice between the new covenant
marriage statute and the standard form of marriage governed by statutes in
existence when the new covenant marriage law was enacted.
1. What is Covenant Marriage?
The covenant marriage statutes differ from the standard marriage statutes
in several key ways. First, the covenant marriage statutes contain much more
stringent entrance requirements. In Louisiana, a couple desiring to enter a
covenant marriage must execute a declaration of intent to contract a covenant
marriage. The declaration states the couple’s commitment to: (1) live together as
husband and wife for the remainder of their lives; (2) disclose to each other
everything that could adversely affect their marriage; (3) receive premarital
counseling regarding the nature, purpose and responsibility of marriage; and (4)
take all reasonable efforts to preserve the marriage, including marital counseling
as may be necessary.84 The declaration of intent must include an affidavit by the
couple “attesting that they have received premarital counseling from a priest,
minister, rabbi, clerk of the Religious Society of Friends, any clergyman of any
religious sect, or a professional marriage counselor.”85 The counseling must
include “a discussion of the seriousness of covenant marriage, communication
that a covenant marriage is a commitment for life, and a discussion of the
obligation to seek marital counseling in times of marital difficulties.”86 The
marriage bills were unsuccessfully introduced in Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Indiana, Illinois and
Washington).
79. Id. at 944.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 946. For an interesting discussion of the manner in which the covenant marriage bill
was introduced in the Louisiana legislature and ultimately became law, see Gary H. Nichols,
Covenant Marriage: Should Tennessee Join the Noble Experiment?, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 397, 442–44 (1999)
(explaining how Representative Perkins introduced the legislation in a manner which made
opposing the bill the same as being against the idea of family).
83. Chauncey E. Brummer, The Shackles of Covenant Marriage: Who Holds the Keys to Wedlock?, 25
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 261, 276, 278 (2003).
84. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:273(A)(1) (2000).
85. Id. § 9:273(A)(2)(a).
86. Id.
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affidavit must also confirm that the couple has “received and read the
informational pamphlet developed and promulgated by the office of the
attorney general entitled ‘Covenant Marriage Act’ which provides a full
explanation of the terms and conditions of a covenant marriage.”87 The
declaration of intent must also include an attestation, signed by the counselor,
“confirming that the parties were counseled as to the nature and purpose of the
marriage.”88
Second, the covenant marriage statutes make obtaining a divorce more
difficult than in the standard marriage statutes. In Louisiana, individuals bound
by covenant marriage can obtain a divorce by proving that: (1) the other spouse
has committed adultery; (2) the other spouse has committed a felony and has
been sentenced to death or imprisonment at hard labor; (3) the other spouse has
abandoned the matrimonial domicile for one year and refuses to return; (4) the
other spouse has physically or sexually abused the spouse seeking the divorce
or a child of either spouse; or (5) the spouses have been living apart
continuously without reconciliation for two years.89 A spouse in a covenant
marriage may choose to obtain a judgment of separation from bed and board (a
legal separation short of divorce) rather than divorce by proof of the identical
grounds mentioned above.90 Additional grounds for obtaining a judgment of
separation from bed and board include proof of “habitual intemperance of the
other spouse, or excesses, cruel treatment, or outrages of the other spouse, if
such habitual intemperance, or such ill-treatment is of such a nature as to render
their living together insupportable.”91 A divorce may also be obtained if the
spouses have been living apart continuously without reconciliation for one year
after the execution of a judgment for separation from bed and board.92 That
period is extended to eighteen months if there exists at least one minor child of
the marriage, unless abuse of a child is the basis for obtaining the judgment of
separation from bed and board, in which case the period reverts to one year.93
Finally, the statute requires that the spouses take all reasonable steps to
preserve the marriage, including the marital counseling described in the
declaration of intent, whenever the spouses experience marital difficulties. In
the event of a separation, marital counseling must continue until a divorce is
obtained.94 However, marital counseling is not required “when the other spouse
has physically or sexually abused the spouse seeking the divorce or a child of
one of the spouses.”95

87. Id.
88. Id. § 9:273(A)(2)(b).
89. Id. § 9:307(A).
90. Id. § 9:307(B).
91. Id.
92. Id. § 9:307(A)(6)(a).
93. Id. § 9:307(A)(6)(b).
94. Id. § 9:307(C).
95. Id. § 9:307(D). As stated above, the covenant marriage statutes in Arizona and Arkansas are
substantially similar to Louisiana’s, with just a few minor differences. See Brummer, supra note 83, at
276–78. (“The only major differences in the Arizona law appear in the grounds for marital
dissolution. The Arizona covenant marriage statute permits a party to seek a divorce when the other
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2. Criticism of Covenant Marriage
a. The Divorce Provisions
Covenant marriage laws have been the subject of much criticism. Most
criticism revolves around the statute’s divorce provisions, chiefly the return to
the fault-based divorce laws that proved so unworkable in the past. Regardless
of one’s opinion regarding whether fault-based divorce laws or no-fault divorce
is preferable from a public policy standpoint, making a divorce more difficult to
obtain forces married couples desiring a divorce to discover more creative ways
of achieving that objective. This is apparent from examining the practices of
divorcing couples at a time when most of the states required fault-based
divorce.
A common way of avoiding the stringent requirements of a fault-based
divorce statute was to examine the required fault grounds, collude with each
other and with third parties, and create a situation to satisfy at least one of the
statutory grounds for divorce. For example,
[t]he use of “hotel perjury” was widespread during the height of fault-based
divorce. In trying to secure a divorce based on the grounds of adultery, couples
would “team up” to recreate the famous hotel scene. Couples arranged for the
husband to be caught in the act of “sitting beside a scantily clad” anonymous
female (preferably blonde) when the wife, a process server, and private
detective armed with a camera burst in. This practice became common
knowledge when an expose in the New York Mirror lead with the headline “I
Was the Unknown Blonde in 100 NY Divorces.”96

For couples unwilling to lie in court to obtain their divorce, other methods
were available. Because every state’s divorce statute was different, spouses
could simply cross state lines to find a state with more liberal divorce laws than
their resident state. Some states, mostly in the western region, saw the
opportunity for profit by attracting spouses from more restrictive states and
convincing them to vacation there for long enough to satisfy a short residency
requirement and subsequently obtain a divorce.97 Spouses who lacked the

spouse has habitually used drugs or alcohol, . . . [and] permits parties to a covenant marriage to
obtain a divorce when they mutually agree to do so.”).
96. Heather Flory, “I Promise to Love, Honor, Obey . . . and Not Divorce You”: Covenant Marriage
and the Backlash Against No-Fault Divorce, 34 FAM. L.Q. 133, 136 n.24 (2000) (citing J. HERBERT
DIFONZO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE OF DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH
CENTURY AMERICA 89 (1997)). See also Jeanne Louise Carriere, “It’s Déjà vu All Over Again”: The
Covenant Marriage Act in Popular Cultural Perception and Legal Reality, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1701, 1743–45
(1998). (“A less expensive form of perjury also proved useful in obtaining annulments for fraud. It
required not hotel rooms and paid correspondents, but merely witnesses willing to testify that they
were present prior to the marriage and heard one spouse misrepresent his position on, for example,
birth control.”).
97. See Flory, supra note 96, at 136. See Carriere, supra note 96, at 1731–43, for an extensive
discussion of “migratory divorce” as it was practiced when fault-based divorce laws were still
prevalent. “Migratory divorce” was enabled by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
Constitution, which requires that a divorce granted by a U.S. jurisdiction be given effect in every
sister state.

MUSSELMAN__FMT1.DOC

50 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

1/21/2009 12:41:44 PM

Volume 16:37 2009

means or wherewithal to find ways around stringent divorce requirements
simply abandoned their spouses and families and disappeared, oftentimes
leaving families without much-needed support.98
Some commentators have examined the specific fault-based grounds of the
covenant marriage statutes and concluded that they exclude situations that may
present serious risk of harm to a spouse or child. For example, the Louisiana
statute provides grounds for divorce if the spouse seeking the divorce or a child
of either spouse is subject to physical or sexual abuse. But it makes no provision
for other dangerous behavior, such as “extreme emotional abuse, threatening
behavior, confinement or the withholding of financial support.”99 This failure is
tempered by a spouse’s ability to obtain a separation from bed and board for
“habitual intemperance of the other spouse, or excesses, cruel treatment, or
outrages of the other spouse, if such habitual intemperance, or such ill-treatment
is of such a nature as to render their living together insupportable.”100 It
provides “a covenant marriage spouse who has been victimized in . . . [non]physical ways with a means by which [he or] she can escape an abusive
marriage without waiting two years for a no-fault divorce . . . .”101 However, a
victimized spouse still could not obtain a divorce until either the one year or
eighteen month period (as applicable) after the execution of a judgment for
separation from bed and board has passed.102 Those waiting periods, although
shorter than the standard two year waiting period for a no-fault divorce,103 are
particularly troubling in the case of an abusive marriage.
During this period, the lives of everyone involved are on hold. Neither partner
may go forward and remarry, and the partners may not temporarily reconcile
without erasing all of the time accrued under the statutory waiting period.
Furthermore, this waiting period offers the abuser the opportunity to
manipulate and harass the victim for an additional [time period].
Moreover, these potential effects of delay increase the danger that a
psychologically damaged and frail person might decide that it is easier to return
to the unhealthy marriage than to endure the [applicable] separation period.104

Commentators have identified another problem with a fault-based divorce
regime regarding when the statutory fault grounds have been met. Courts have
experienced significant difficulty determining the meaning of such terms as
adultery and cruelty given the multiplicity and variety of fact patterns with
which they have been forced to deal.105 Furthermore, difficult questions
regarding the meaning of certain fault-based terms and issues as to whether the
fault grounds can be proved in a particular case have driven up litigation

98. Carriere, supra note 96, at 137.
99. Id. at 141.
100. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:307(B) (2000).
101. Carriere, supra note 96, at 1725–26.
102. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
104. Daniel W. Olivas, Tennessee Considers Adopting the Louisiana Covenant Marriage Act: A Law
Waiting to Be Ignored, 71 TENN. L. REV. 769, 791 (2004).
105. Carriere, supra note 96, at 1708–09.
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expenses and significantly protracted the divorce process.106 Protracting the
process is, of course, one of the key points of covenant marriage. The hope is
that by slowing down the process considerably the spouses will decide to
reconcile before the final divorce judgment. In abusive marriages, this delay
simply extends the time for the abuser to continue victimizing the other spouse,
and reconciliation is hardly the desired result. But even where abuse is not a
factor, utilizing fault grounds for this purpose will have the undesirable effect of
ratcheting up the acrimony between the spouses.107
Encouraging fault litigation can harden attitudes of self-righteous defensiveness,
contempt for the spouse, and vindictiveness that may contribute to the
breakdown of the marriage, regardless of the specific fault ground on which
divorce is brought. It also discourages reconciliation; partners who are
marshaling evidence against one another of fundamental violations of the
marital understanding, and accusing each other of these in the public records,
are more likely to nurse a sense of grievance and less likely to be in a mood to
resume the marital life together than those who are merely living separate and
apart.108

Increasing the cost of divorce is a particularly egregious result that should
be avoided to the extent possible. Litigation is an enormously expensive process
for all parties, but it creates hardships particularly for spouses litigating a
divorce. Financial difficulties are a major cause of divorce in the first place.109
Divorce costs consume critical financial resources that spouses need for living
expenses for themselves and their children. The aggregate cost of living for the
spouses as a whole increases significantly after divorce because they now must
support two households. The financial effects of divorce are often particularly
burdensome for women. Studies have concluded that divorced women and
their children experience a significant decline in their standard of living in the
first year after divorce, while divorced men experience a significant increase.110
b. The Counseling Requirements
Another major criticism of the covenant marriage laws has been the
counseling requirements. As stated above, the Louisiana statute requires that a
couple desiring to enter a covenant marriage must attest that they have received
premarital counseling regarding the nature, purpose and responsibility of
marriage, and they have committed themselves to take all reasonable efforts to
preserve the marriage, which include marital counseling if necessary.111
The Louisiana statute originally required that counseling also include a
discussion of the exclusive grounds for legally terminating a covenant

106.
107.
108.
109.
(2004).
110.
111.

Id. at 1722.
Id.
Id. at 1723–24.
Margaret M. Mahoney, Debts, Divorce and Disarray in Bankruptcy, 73 UMKC L. REV. 83, 91
VanSickle, supra note 43, at 169.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:273(A)(1) (2000).
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marriage.112 This requirement has been heavily criticized primarily on grounds
that the persons authorized by the statute to provide the counseling had no legal
training and were wholly unqualified to provide any such legal advice.113 In
addition, this requirement prompted the Catholic Church to refuse to require
that couples seeking to marry in the church choose covenant marriage,114
reasoning that “[a]ny discussion of divorce ‘would confuse or obscure the
integrity’ of church teaching on the permanence of marriage.”115 The Church
also “prohibit[ed] their counselors from discussing this issue with couples.”116
The Louisiana statute was amended in 1999 to eliminate this requirement and
was replaced with an obligation that the couple attest in their affidavit that they
have “received and read the informational pamphlet developed and
promulgated by the [O]ffice of the [A]ttorney [G]eneral entitled ‘Covenant
Marriage Act’ which provide[d] a full explanation of the terms and conditions of
a covenant marriage.”117 The Arizona118 and Arkansas119 covenant marriage
statutes continue to include the requirement that counseling include a
discussion of the exclusive grounds for legally terminating a covenant marriage
by divorce.
The principal criticism of the counseling requirements focuses on the
statute’s silence regarding the amount and quality of counseling a couple must
receive. The topics required to be included in the premarital counseling are
extremely general and vague, and there is no indication of how many hours of
counseling are required. It has been suggested that the premarital counseling
requirements are so ambiguous as to be rendered meaningless.120 Further,
although the statute lists categories of persons who are allowed to provide the
counseling, it requires no particular qualifications. As a result, the premarital
counseling requirement “may be reduced to an empty formality.”121 The
absence of any meaningful requirements regarding the counseling aspects of the
covenant marriage statutes was apparently intentional to “avoid serious
objections from those issued an invitation to assist in preserving marriages[;]”122
however, it is hardly a justification for including statutory counseling
requirements that are virtually worthless. If premarital counseling has any real
value, the statute should require real counseling that is designed to achieve the
desired results.123

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Carriere, supra note 96, at 1707.
Id. at 1708–09.
Id. at 1708.
Nichols, supra note 78, at 955.
Id.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9: 273(A)(2)(a) (2000).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-901 (2000).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-804(2)(B).
Carriere, supra note 96, at 1705.
Id. at 1708.
Olivas, supra note 104, at 789.
See infra pp. 29−30, proposing requirements for premarital counseling.
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The concept of making premarital counseling a requirement or at least an
option before couples receive a marriage license is hardly novel.124 There are
two basic propositions that can be advanced for requiring premarital
counseling. First, appropriate premarital counseling will better prepare couples
for the realities of marriage and the issues they will inevitably face. That
preparation will give them a greater chance at a successful marriage, and allow
them to build a stronger foundation for their marriage before it even begins.
Ultimately, the number of marriages that end in divorce will be reduced because
“offering couples a realistic picture of love, marriage, and their future
companion . . . provides couples with the opportunity to ‘test’ their marriage
before it begins (or ends). The inevitable result is a stronger marriage, and
consequently lower divorce rates.”125
Second, appropriate premarital
counseling will force couples who are ill-suited to acknowledge
their
differences, and possibly decide to avoid entering into a problematic marriage
that might eventually end in divorce. As Tony Perkins, the lead sponsor of
Louisiana’s covenant marriage legislation explained, deciding whether to enter
into a covenant marriage
requires a couple to stop in the midst of a process that is driven by feeling and
emotion to have a discussion about the depth of their marital commitment.
Some couples may have their first and last argument over whether to [enter into
a covenant marriage]. In my view avoiding a bad marriage is just as good as
creating a good marriage. [Discussing whether to enter into a covenant
marriage] will prevent a number of broken homes because the couple will part
ways when they cannot agree on the depth of their marital commitment.126

The basic question is whether requiring premarital counseling will achieve
either of those two goals to any measurable extent. There are examples where
premarital counseling, appropriately structured, has successfully achieved at
least some of the above-described objectives. One particularly noteworthy
example involves a Maryland organization named Marriage Savers, which “has
established community-wide marriage policies and provides premarital
education programs to prepare engaged couples for a lifelong marriage
commitment, as well as marriage mentoring programs for couples in troubled
marriages.”127 The programs are church-based and clergy in a particular
community agree to require participation by couples they marry.128 The
program involves a
4-month marriage preparation course, which includes religious teachings; a
premarital assessment of the couple’s individual opinions on significant issues,
such as finances and childrearing, by using premarital inventory like PREPARE

124. See, e.g., Lynne Marie Kohm, A Comparative Survey of Covenant Marriage Proposals in the
United States, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 31, 36 (1999–2000) (discussing legislation enacted in Florida
dealing with the optional availability of premarital counseling); Carriere, supra note 96, at 1706–07
(discussing unsuccessfully proposed legislation in Michigan requiring premarital counseling).
125. Flory, supra note 96, at 146.
126. Nichols, supra note 78, at 446.
127. Nicole Licata, Should Premarital Counseling Be Mandatory as a Requisite to Obtaining a Marriage
License?, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 518, 523 (2002).
128. Id.
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and FOCCUS; mentoring from married couples; a program that guides couples
through the first years of marriage; and also a program to strengthen existing
marriages.129

Marriage Savers programs and community-wide policies have been
adopted in more than 135 cities and have resulted in a dramatic reduction in the
number of divorces.130 Modesto, California was the first city to adopt a
premarital counseling requirement using a Marriage Savers program, after
which “the divorce rate plummeted 47.6%.”131 Subsequently, Marriage Savers
programs were adopted in other cities with similar results, including El Paso,
Texas; Kansas City, Kansas; Charleston, West Virginia; Fairfield, Connecticut;
Harrisonburg, Virginia; and Jamestown, New York.132
In addition to Marriage Savers, premarital counseling programs that have
achieved some degree of success include: “Practical Application of Intimate
Relationship Skills (PAIRS); Prevention and Relationship Enhancement Program
(PREP); Save Your Marriage Before It Starts (SYMBIS); and Relationship
Enhancement (RE).”133 Professor of psychology David Olson at the University
of Minnesota has developed a program entitled “Premarital Personal and
Relationship Evaluation” (PREPARE) which includes a psychological test he
calls a “premarital inventory” composed of “one hundred and twenty-five
questions on personal values and perceptions; its purpose is ‘to unearth issues
that don’t come up during courtship.’ It is so revealing that ten percent of the
couples who take it decide against marrying one another.”134 Professor Olson’s
program also requires “a waiting period of four months before the wedding.”135
A number of studies and surveys have been conducted regarding the
effectiveness of premarital counseling programs. The authors of one study
found that participants in a premarital counseling program were “half as likely
to get divorced within five years of marriage.”136 Another study “found that
within the first 4 years of marriage, 80% of the individuals surveyed reported
the counseling as valuable to the strength and duration of their marriage.”137
To achieve the desired goals, the quality and duration of premarital
counseling is undeniably important. Couples in love and on the brink of
marriage are typically overly optimistic, idealistic and naïve and are generally
not thinking about the issues they will face once married. Premarital counseling
should offer a more realistic picture by bringing these couples to terms with
129. Id. (explaining that “PREPARE and FOCCUS” are research-based inventories of
compatibility for marriage. These assessments help couples improve their relationship by getting
them to discuss potential areas of conflict). Id. at 523 n.56.
130. Id. at 523.
131. Id.
132. Id. (describing statistics provided by the founder and President of Marriage Savers
emphasizing that “he has not tracked the couples that actually participated in Marriage Savers.
Therefore, the data are based on general marital statistics in the community irrespective of the
couple’s participation in premarital counseling programs.”).
133. Flory, supra note 96, at 145.
134. Carriere, supra note 96, at 1707.
135. Id.
136. Licata, supra note 127, at 523.
137. Id.
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Examples

1. An analysis of each partner’s personality and a discussion of how differences
identified in that analysis will be addressed and accommodated by each of
them;
2. An analysis of each partner’s communication style, and a discussion of the
manner in which they intend to communicate with each other during the
marriage;
3. An analysis of the manner in which each partner resolves conflict in their
lives, and a discussion of the manner in which they intend to resolve conflict in
their marriage;
4. A discussion of the individual needs of each partner, and the manner and
frequency in which each partner expects those needs to be met;
5. A discussion of the level of commitment to the marriage that each partner
expects of the other;
6. An analysis of each partner’s sexual expectations, and a discussion of how
differences identified in that analysis will be addressed and accommodated by
each of them;
7. A discussion of whether each partner desires to have children. If both
partners desire to have children, then they should fully discuss all issues with
regard to parenting them, including discipline, education, religion, health and
finance;
8. An analysis of the manner in which each partner views relationships with
extended family members, and a discussion of how differences in that analysis
will be addressed and accommodated by each of them;
9. An analysis of the manner in which each partner views relationships with
friends, and a discussion of how differences in that analysis will be addressed
and accommodated by each of them;
10. A discussion of financial issues that will arise during the marriage. This
should include a discussion of each partner’s expectations with regard to
whether one or both of them will be responsible for managing their finances
after marriage, and whether one or both of them will be responsible for
providing the financial resources required by the family. The partners should
fully disclose to each other their current financial status, including the source
and amount of income, and all assets and liabilities. Ideally, the couple should
jointly complete a financial management course to prepare them for all the
financial issues and problems that will inevitably arise during their marriage;
11. An analysis of each partner’s religious beliefs, and a discussion of how
differences identified in that analysis will be addressed and accommodated by
each of them;
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12. An analysis of the physical and mental health of each partner, and a
discussion of how any issues identified will affect their relationship and
marriage. With regard to mental health, many couples enter marriage with one
or both of them having unresolved childhood issues that detrimentally affect
their relationship with their spouse, oftentimes even explaining why they chose
that person as a future spouse in the first place. In many cases, individual
therapy prior to the marriage for a partner with those issues would be extremely
beneficial, either to assist the partner in having a healthy relationship with his
spouse; or to assist the partner in determining that, because of those issues, the
person he chose as a future spouse is not a good match for him, thereby
avoiding entering into a problem marriage in the first place.

The covenant marriage laws are on the right track by requiring premarital
counseling, but they must go much further in specifying both the amount and
quality of counseling and the requisite qualifications of counselors. First, the
covenant marriage laws should provide at minimum for a specific counseling
program that would be designed by a committee of highly qualified, stateappointed, professional marriage counselors and mental health professionals. A
financial management course should be required in addition to the counseling.
In appropriate cases, when counselors determine that one or both partners have
unresolved personal issues or mental health concerns that might detrimentally
affect the marriage or relationship of the partners, they should be required to
refer a partner for individual therapy and to suspend the counseling process
until the partner has appropriately addressed the issues identified. The
program should be subject to revision from time to time as may be necessary.
Second, there should be a minimum number of hours required to
successfully complete the program and which should be sufficiently substantial
to meaningfully cover all of the required topics. The counseling should be
provided at set intervals over a significant period of time, preferably at least six
months, to allow for appropriate discussion and reflection during the periods
between counseling sessions.
Finally, persons providing counseling should have obtained the minimum
level of education appropriate to the degree of services rendered. The financial
issues associated with such an extensive premarital counseling requirement can
be addressed by implementing a fee schedule used by counselors. The fees can
be set on a sliding scale based on a couple’s income, if necessary.
Covenant marriage laws have also been criticized for requiring that couples
seek counseling whenever marital difficulties arise. Specifically, the Louisiana
statute provides that a couple entering a covenant marriage must commit to
taking all reasonable efforts to preserve the marriage, including marital
counseling.138 As with the premarital counseling requirement, the statute is
silent as to the amount and quality of counseling that the couple must receive.139
In addition, the statute makes no attempt to define any terms, such as “marital

138. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:273(A)(1) (2000).
139. See Olivas, supra note 104, at 790 (stating that the statute does not specify who will provide
the counseling, the required content of the counseling, or for how long the counseling must be
continued).
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difficulties” or “reasonable efforts.”140 As a practical matter, these provisions are
best viewed as a course of conduct to which a covenant marriage couple agrees
to aspire.
The marital counseling provisions have been heavily criticized even when
viewed in the most favorable light. A principal criticism is that the inclusion of
these provisions in the statute implies that they may somehow be enforced.
Courts could most efficiently enforce these provisions by forcing couples who
have filed a divorce action to participate in some form of marital counseling.141
However, various authors have questioned the value of forcing couples into
“coercive” marital counseling.142 If the goal is reconciliation, both marital
partners must fully participate in good faith in the counseling effort. Professor
Carriere supports that argument by citing previously unsuccessful efforts in Los
Angeles and New Jersey in the 1950s, which required marital counseling prior to
obtaining a divorce with the stated goal of reconciliation.143 The New Jersey
experiment “ended with a failure rate of 97.3 percent.”144
One particularly compelling criticism of the marital counseling
requirements relates to statistics showing that many marriages ending in
divorce involve domestic violence.145 Professor Carriere cites Martha Mahoney’s
estimate that “domestic violence is an experience common to ‘[u]p to one half of
all American women—and approximately two thirds of women who are
separated or divorced.’”146 An abused spouse is particularly vulnerable when
separating from her abuser or filing for divorce.147 The Louisiana covenant
marriage statute originally contained no exemption in the marital counseling
provisions for abused or battered spouses.148 Requiring abused spouses to
engage in marital counseling with their abusers makes little sense and creates
potentially tragic results. In such a case, reconciliation is impossible and would
be wholly undesirable from any perspective. Professor Carriere argues that
requiring a battered spouse to comply with a counseling requirement could put
such spouse at great risk of harm: seeking counseling could be interpreted by
the batterer spouse as an imminent departure by the battered spouse; it would
be impossible for the battered spouse to keep her intentions to file for divorce
secret; and the counseling would permit the batterer spouse continued contact
with the battered spouse and increase the possibility that the battered spouse
will be located. Professor Carriere points to the Post-Separation Family Violence

140. See id. at 789–90 (asserting that couples must decide for themselves when their marriage is in
such a state that marital counseling is required, and how much effort to save their marriage is
reasonable).
141. See Carriere, supra note 96, at 1711 (noting that other methods of enforcement, such as an
action in contract filed by one spouse against the other, would be problematic at best).
142. E.g., id. at 1712.
143. See id. at 1712–13 (suggesting that requiring couples to engage in counseling before a
divorce could be granted serves no benefit in most cases, other than possibly assuring them that
there is no hope of reconciliation, thereby helping them adjust to their divorce).
144. Id. at 1713.
145. See id. at 1714.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1714–15.
148. Id. at 1715–16.
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Relief Act, which exempts victims of family violence from court-ordered
mediation, as a model for adoption in the covenant marriage law.149
Consequently, the statute was appropriately amended in 2004 to provide that
marital counseling is not required “when the other spouse has physically or
sexually abused the spouse seeking the divorce or a child of one of the
spouses.”150
c. Other Criticisms
Although the divorce and counseling provisions have produced the most
criticism, covenant marriage laws have been criticized in various other ways.
Some commentators have praised the enactment of covenant marriage laws as
an alternate form of marriage and the subsequent establishment of a two-tiered
marriage system in the adopting states.151 Even so, some of these commentators
lament that couples will likely feel coerced into choosing a covenant marriage
over the standard form.152 One author suggests that
couples deciding on the type of marriage that best suits them may be vulnerable
to internal pressure that one person places upon the other to select a covenant
marriage. For example, one partner might frame the choice as proof of the
depth of love between them or as a test of the other partner’s degree of
commitment. . . . Therefore, the desire of one partner for a standard
arrangement may signal doubts to the other about the marriage as a whole.153

The implication is that the partner desiring the standard form of marriage
will instead be coerced by his partner into a covenant marriage. In addition, “a
couple’s choice may be strong-armed by the religious community. . . . Some
members of the clergy may refuse to perform standard marriages, forcing
couples involved in a particular church to choose a covenant marriage or go
elsewhere to have a ceremony.”154 Finally, couples may feel pressure to choose a
covenant marriage if they perceive that the covenant marriage laws “devalue or
stigmatize standard marriage.”155 One author opines that “[t]his is perhaps the
ugliest aspect of the law. By creating a separate class of marriage, the Act
expressly endorses the policy of grading the sanctity of matrimony and fosters
by implication the notion that some bonds are holier, godlier, or more
courageous than others.”156 These concerns are exacerbated by the risk that
couples choosing covenant marriage will not have sufficient legal information,

149. Id. at 1716–17.
150. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.307(D) (2000).
151. See, e.g., Olivas, supra note 104, at 784 (suggesting that allowing couples to choose between
covenant marriage and regular marriage is appealing to both supporters and critics of covenant
marriage); Nichols, supra note 82, at 454 (suggesting that the strongest argument in favor of the
covenant marriage law is that it is not mandatory).
152. See id. at 454–55 (suggesting that an individual may be pressured into choosing covenant
marriage by his intended spouse or by religious leaders).
153. Olivas, supra note 104, at 784–85.
154. Id. at 785. See also Nichols, supra note 78, at 454–55.
155. Olivas, supra note 104, at 785. See also Nichols, supra note 78, at 449.
156. Olivas, supra note 104, at 786.
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particularly with regard to the divorce provisions of the legislation, to make a
fully informed choice.157
These criticisms miss the point altogether. As for one partner pressuring
the other into a covenant marriage, that is precisely one of the principal goals of
the legislation. To emphasize Tony Perkins’ explanation (quoted above) of the
covenant marriage legislation in Louisiana, deciding whether to enter into a
covenant marriage forces a couple in the midst of the highly emotional process
of planning their wedding and finalizing their marriage to have a deep and
meaningful discussion regarding the level of commitment they desire to make to
each other; that discussion may result in a decision not to marry if they are
unable to agree on that issue, which would be a desirable result if it prevents a
subsequent divorce.158 As for the religious community strong-arming couples
into choosing covenant marriage, one must first consider whether a religious
organization encouraging its members to follow the organization’s teachings is
classifiable as “strong arming.” If so, then of course that is what will happen.
No one is required to belong to a particular religious organization or be married
in a particular church. If some members of the clergy refuse to perform
standard marriages, then a couple choosing that form of marriage will simply
have to be married elsewhere. As for covenant marriage laws devaluing or
stigmatizing standard marriage, that may or may not be the result, depending
on society’s constantly evolving views toward marriage in general. It is just as
likely that society may place a higher value on standard marriage than on
covenant marriage, or even place a higher value on avoiding marriage
altogether.159
The covenant marriage laws have often been criticized simply because they
have not proven to be popular. Thus far, relatively few couples have opted for
covenant marriage in the states that have adopted it.160 A study conducted in
1998 surveyed a random sample of Louisiana residents regarding, among other
issues, their “knowledge of and perceived effects of covenant marriage.”161 The
authors found that
[v]ery few couples choose covenant marriage. The public knows relatively little
about the law and the clerks and their staff only partially implement the law as
originally envisioned.

157. See id. at 786–88 (discussing the failure of the Louisiana covenant marriage law to require
that a legal professional explain the legal consequences of covenant marriage to couples considering
that option).
158. Nichols, supra note 78, at 446.
159. As discussed above, couples are increasingly choosing cohabitation over marriage. See supra
notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
160. See Cynthia DeSimone, Covenant Marriage Legislation: How the Absence of Interfaith Religious
Discourse Has Stifled the Effort to Strengthen Marriage, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 391, 419–20 (2003) (citing
statistics reflecting that, in Louisiana, no more than three percent of couples marrying during the
first two years after the effective date of the covenant marriage legislation chose covenant marriage;
in Arizona, only about four percent of marrying couples chose covenant marriage).
161. Laura Sanchez, et al., The Implementation of Covenant Marriage in Louisiana, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y
& L. 192, 198 (2001).
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Proponents want the covenant marriage law to force every young couple to
consider the question, “Are you serious about this marriage or not?” In practice,
this happens only rarely. Unless couples come to the clerks’ office armed with
knowledge and intent, all they will usually hear about covenant marriage is that
it is not something they are likely to be interested in.162

The authors suggest that covenant marriage is not likely to catch on in
Louisiana unless the state does a better job educating the public about the law
and effectively trains staff in the clerks’ offices to explain the covenant marriage
option.163
Feminist scholars have been particularly vitriolic in criticizing the covenant
marriage laws. Professor VanSickle asserts that covenant marriage imposes
“anti-feminist limitations upon the ability to seek and obtain a divorce [that]
serve to catapult women back into positions of subordination to and financial
dependence upon men.”164 She argues that the introduction of no-fault divorce
laws “forced women to become better educated, more marketable, and
consequently, more financially independent. To revert to a traditional, faultbased divorce system would encourage women to resume traditional gender
roles, which emphasize the financial dependence of women on their spouses.”165
As a result, “covenant marriage laws are anti-feminist in their conception and
application. Indeed, they are infantilizing to women and cast them into a place
of perpetual subordination.”166
Professor VanSickle also criticizes the religious underpinnings to the
covenant marriage laws. She argues that covenant marriage is a dangerous
impediment to women’s attempts to escape the stigma associated with western
religions, particularly Christianity, and their “fundamental belief in the
necessity of female submission to male dominance.”167 Professor VanSickle uses
examples from the Bible to assert that western religions treat women as “inferior
and impressionable creatures that require the guidance of men.”168 The
implication is that marriage laws based on these teachings are unacceptably
sexist and paternalistic, and do great harm to advances made by women in their
long and painful “uphill battle toward gender equality.”169
3. Should It Stay or Should It Go?
Should the covenant marriage laws be embraced as the cure-all to society’s
marriage-related ills, or should the entire concept of covenant marriage be
rejected as an ill-conceived notion that creates more problems than it solves?
Over the course of history, marriage has always been deeply entangled with
human relationships, family values and expectations, religious beliefs, and
162. Id. at 222.
163. Id. at 222–23.
164. VanSickle, supra note 43, at 156.
165. Id. at 159 (quoting Nicole D. Lindsey, Marriage and Divorce: Degrees of “I Do,” an Analysis of
the Ever-Changing Paradigm of Divorce, 9 J. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 265, 280 (1998)).
166. VanSickle, supra note 43, at 160.
167. Id. at 163.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 178.
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societal traditions and customs. As such, it is easily one of the most convoluted
and problematic social issues in today’s society. It is unsurprising that so much
disagreement exists over what form or forms of marriage should be available
under our laws. It is this article’s contention that the concept of covenant
marriage is an essential ingredient to the law of marriage in the United States,
and that enactment of the covenant marriage statutes that presently exist in
Louisiana, Arizona and Arkansas is a good start in developing that concept;
however, many of the criticisms described above are valid and compelling. It is
now time to take the next step by amending these laws to further develop
covenant marriage and address these criticisms while at the same time reaching
higher to establish an elevated standard for marriage. This standard should
effectively account for the spiritual, physical, emotional, financial, and legal
components that the union of two separate lives represents.
Especially compelling are the criticisms of the divorce provisions of the
covenant marriage laws. The fault-based divorce laws of the past failed
miserably for all the reasons stated above.170 Returning to a system that we
already know cannot work would be ludicrous and is certainly no path to
progress. New pathways must be found to achieve the ideals of the covenant
marriage laws while leaving the divorce provisions of current law generally
intact. The counseling provisions of the covenant marriage laws provide the
best opportunity for achieving this objective.
As stated earlier, requiring premarital counseling is aimed at achieving two
basic goals. First, appropriate premarital counseling will better prepare couples
for the realities of marriage and the issues they will inevitably face, thereby
allowing them to build a stronger foundation for their marriage and increasing
the chances that the marriage will be successful. Second, appropriate premarital
counseling will force couples who are ill-suited for each other to come face to
face with their differences, and possibly decide to avoid altogether entering into
a problematic marriage that might eventually end in divorce.
The problem with the covenant marriage legislation currently in effect is
that the premarital counseling requirements are woefully ineffective in
achieving those goals.171 As discussed above, premarital counseling has been
shown to be effective, but the counseling must be based on a carefully crafted
program substantial enough to meaningfully address the multitude of issues
couples face during marriage.172 Accordingly, this article argues that the
covenant marriage laws should at minimum provide for a specific counseling
program which would be designed by a committee of highly qualified, stateappointed, professional marriage counselors and mental health professionals,
and which would include the additional components discussed in Part III.B.2.b.
In addition, there should be a minimum number of hours of counseling required
to complete the program, which should sufficiently cover all of the required
topics. The counseling should be provided at set intervals over a significant
period of time, preferably at least six months, to allow for appropriate
discussion and reflection during the periods between the counseling sessions.
170. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 120−122 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 127−137 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the persons authorized to provide the counseling should be required to
have completed a minimum level of education appropriate to the counseling
services being provided.
Many of the criticisms of the post-marital counseling provisions of the
covenant marriage laws are also valid. As discussed above, the statute is silent
with regard to the amount and quality of counseling that a couple must receive,
and the statute makes no attempt to define many of the terms used.173 In
addition, these provisions are difficult, if not impossible, to enforce and many
have questioned the wisdom of forcing a married couple into counseling after
significant marital difficulties have already surfaced.174
Marital counseling would be more beneficial to couples before they begin
experiencing significant marital difficulties. Accordingly, the covenant marriage
laws should require couples to participate in a minimum number of hours of
counseling each year they are married. The statute could provide several
different options for a couple to satisfy this requirement, including traditional
counseling provided by a qualified counselor, group counseling with other
couples, marriage retreats, or the like. The goal would be to enhance the
couple’s communication skills regarding marital issues as they arise, rather than
waiting for more serious difficulties that are more difficult to resolve.
Counseling would also make it easier for couples to seek counseling at those
times when they need it most.
Enforcement issues would most certainly arise with respect to these
requirements. An approach that provides both a carrot and a stick might be
more efficient than standard enforcement practices. Many jurisdictions have
some type of post-filing waiting period before a divorce can be obtained.175 The
covenant marriage laws could shorten the waiting period for couples who could
prove that they fully complied with the marital counseling provisions. These
couples could argue they addressed their marital issues as they arose and
therefore require no additional counseling before they divorce. They did their
best to make the marriage work and complied with all statutory requirements
designed to give them the best chance for marital success; the marriage simply
did not work. On the same theory, the covenant marriage laws could lengthen
the waiting period for couples who could not prove that they fully complied
with the marital counseling provisions. Arguably, these couples need more time
to sort out the emotional issues that led to their decision to divorce; some may
ultimately decide they were too hasty in deciding to file a divorce petition.
Couples entering into a covenant marriage should also not be allowed to simply
discard the covenant when they have not completed the work during the
marriage that the statute requires. The statute should mandate completion of
the work before the marriage is allowed to end. If they effectively refuse by
giving less than full participation to the marital counseling when they are finally
forced to engage in it, they should at least be required to endure a longer
waiting period before they are allowed to divorce. If, as is often the case, that
there is a “guilty” spouse and an “innocent” spouse, forcing the “innocent”
173. See supra notes 139–140 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 141–144 and accompanying text.
175. See generally Nichols, supra note 78, at 419.
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spouse to endure the longer waiting period along with the “guilty” spouse is not
an unduly burdensome requirement because they both agreed to enter into a
covenant marriage in the first place.
Furthermore, another incentive could be provided by the covenant
marriage laws to encourage couples to comply with the post-marital counseling
provisions. Financial incentives tend to be more effective than other types of
incentives in encouraging human behavior. States could provide some form of
tax relief on an annual basis to those couples who can show that they fully
complied with the marital counseling provisions each year of their marriage.
An additional, compelling criticism of the post-marital counseling
provisions focuses on the role of domestic violence in causing divorce. The
Louisiana covenant marriage statute originally provided no exemption from
counseling for abused or battered spouses, although it was later amended to
provide that marital counseling is not required in the case of physical or sexual
abuse of the spouse seeking the divorce or a child of one of the spouses.176 The
covenant marriage laws should clearly provide that the post-marital counseling
provisions have no application to spouses who can make an adequate showing
that they or their children have been subjected to any kind of abuse. Domestic
violence is simply intolerable either in covenant marriage or in any other legally
recognized relationship.
IV. SHOULD SAME-SEX COUPLES BE ALLOWED TO MARRY?
A. The Debate
Whether same-sex couples should be allowed to marry has become a hotly
contested issue. Proponents began challenging the constitutionality of state
laws banning marriage between same-sex couples as early as the 1970s.177 They
scored their first victory in Hawaii in 1993 when “the Supreme Court of Hawaii
ruled that under the Hawaiian Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause a
marriage license denial to a same-sex couple was presumptively
unconstitutional unless the state established a compelling reason for the
denial.”178 That victory was undone when the Hawaiian legislature amended
the constitution to limit the definition of marriage to unions between a man and
a woman.179
The legislature subsequently enacted legislation extending
domestic partnership rights to same-sex couples, which gave them a limited
form of marital rights.180

176. See supra notes 145–150 and accompanying text.
177. See Kindregan, supra note 7, at 36 (citing to decisions in Kentucky and Washington holding
that those states were not constitutionally required to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples).
See Jones v. Halliahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App.
1974).
178. Id. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
179. Id.
180. Id.
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An Alaskan court ruled in 1998 that the right of privacy guaranteed by the
Alaska Constitution “gave same-sex couples the right to choose life partners.”181
That decision, Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, was rendered moot when the
legislature also amended the Alaska Constitution to limit the definition of
marriage to relationships between a man and a woman.182 In 1999, the Supreme
Court of Vermont held that the “state constitution required Vermont to provide
qualified same-sex couples with the same legal benefits accorded to opposite-sex
couples in marriage. The Vermont legislature responded by authorizing samesex couples to enter civil unions, in which the partners enjoy a lengthy list of
benefits previously available only to married couples.”183
In 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court declared that “barring
an individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage
solely because that person would marry a person of the same sex violates the
Massachusetts Constitution.”184 The decision paved the way for Massachusetts
to become the first state to allow same-sex couples to marry pursuant to the
general marriage law applicable to opposite-sex couples.
The court’s
constitutional analysis centered on due process and equal protection principles
as set forth in the Massachusetts Constitution185 and was based on the denial to
same-sex couples of the “enormous private and social advantages” that
marriage bestowed on opposite-sex couples who choose to marry.186
Subsequently, New Jersey adopted a civil union statute granting same-sex
couples all the rights and responsibilities of marriage except the title,187 and the
Connecticut legislature granted same-sex couples the right to enter into civil
unions.188
Proponents of same-sex marriage have been extraordinarily diligent in
advancing their cause in California. In 1999, the California legislature enacted a
domestic partnership law that allowed same-sex couples, and opposite-sex
couples if at least one partner was more than sixty-two years of age, to establish
domestic partnerships officially recognized by the State.189 Registering as
domestic partners initially entitled a couple to some, but by no means all, of the
state benefits enjoyed by married couples.190 This legislation was amended
several times through 2007, to provide additional benefits to domestic partners

181. Id. at 37. See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743
(Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
185. Id. at 953.
186. Id. at 954.
187. Drobac & Page, supra note 4, at 368.
188. Kindregan, supra note 7, at 38. In addition, Maine and the District of Columbia have
enacted legislation granting limited domestic partnership rights to same-sex couples. See Knauer,
supra note 2, at 1271 nn.58 and 62.
189. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 413 (Cal. 2008).
190. Id. The legislation initially granted domestic partners certain specified hospital visitation
privileges, and authorized the state to provide health benefits to domestic partners of some state
employees. Id.
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and further equalize domestic partners with married couples.191 In 2003, the
legislature substantially amended the domestic partnership law with the stated
goal to provide domestic partners all of the legal rights and benefits available to
married couples.192 Specifically, the legislation provided:
Registered domestic partners shall have the same rights, protections, and
benefits, and shall be subject to the same responsibilities, obligations, and duties
under law, whether they derive from statutes, administrative regulations, court
rules, government policies, common law, or any other provisions or sources of
law, as are granted to or imposed upon spouses.193

The Supreme Court of California has determined that the current effect of
California’s domestic partnership law “generally afford[s] same-sex couples the
opportunity to enter into a domestic partnership and thereby obtain virtually all
of the benefits and responsibilities afforded by California law to married
opposite-sex couples.”194 Nevertheless, on May 15, 2008 the Supreme Court of
California significantly changed the legal landscape with regard to same-sex
marriage by deciding In re Marriage Cases.195 The court held that California’s
statutory provisions limiting the right to marry to opposite-sex couples violated
the California Constitution.196 Along with Massachusetts, California became one
of only two states allowing same-sex couples to marry pursuant to the general
marriage law applicable to opposite-sex couples. The court reasoned that the
legislature’s distinction “between the name for the official family relationship of
opposite-sex couples (marriage) and that for same-sex couples (domestic
partnership)”197 and its exclusion of same-sex couples from the definition of
marriage impermissibly discriminated against same-sex couples on the basis of
sexual orientation, which the court declared to be a suspect classification for
purposes of constitutional analysis. Furthermore, the exclusion “impinge[d]
upon a same-sex couple’s fundamental interest in having their family
relationship accorded the same respect and dignity enjoyed by an opposite-sex
couple.”198 The court concluded that California’s marriage and domestic

191. Id. at 413–16. In 2000, the legislature amended the statute to grant access to domestic
partners to specially designed housing reserved for senior citizens. Id. at 413–14. In 2001, domestic
partners were afforded numerous additional rights, “including the right to sue for wrongful death,
to use employee sick leave to care for an ill partner or an ill child of one’s partner, to make medical
decisions on behalf of an incapacitated partner, to receive unemployment benefits if forced to
relocate because of a partner’s job, and to employ stepparent adoption procedures to adopt a
partner’s child.” Id. at 414. In 2002, domestic partners were provided with the right to automatically
inherit a portion of a deceased partner’s separate property (and certain other rights related to
probate), and the right to receive paid family leave from their employment to care for an ill domestic
partner. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 417–18. Additional amendments were made in 2006 to equalize the rights of domestic
partners and married couples with regard to state income taxes, and in 2007 to allow domestic
partners the option of a name change in connection with the registration process. Id. at 415–16.
195. 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
196. Id. at 402.
197. Id. at 400.
198. Id. at 401.
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partnership statutes violated both the Equal Protection Clause and the
fundamental right to marry embodied in the California Constitution.
Other states have taken the opposite approach. A significant number of
“states have amended their constitutions to limit marriage to heterosexual
couples or to prohibit the recognition of marriages and civil unions entered into
by same-sex couples in other states.”199 In addition, as proponents of same-sex
marriage were making advances, opponents began to express concern regarding
whether a same-sex marriage legal in one state would be entitled to recognition
in the other states under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.200 Ultimately in 2006, Congress was pressured to enact the
Defense of Marriage Act, which provided that
no state, territory, possession or Indian tribe shall be required to give effect to
any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory,
possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex
that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.201

A prodigious amount of commentary has been produced on both sides of
this debate. Following is a summary of the arguments, both pro and con, that
have been most commonly offered.
1. Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage and Rebuttals
A refrain often heard in opposition to same-sex marriage is that marriage is
and always has been defined as a union of one man and one woman.202 A
corollary to that proposition is that expanding the definition of marriage to
include same-sex couples would eliminate all previous marriage entrance
requirements and open the floodgates to movements to expand the definition
further to include “unions of three or more, of immediate family members, or
(most absurdly) of people and members of different species.”203 Proponents of
same-sex marriage respond that justifying the refusal to expand the definition of
marriage through assertions that the current definition of marriage is limited to
a union of one man and one woman utilizes circular logic.204 Justice Greaney
stated in his concurring opinion in Goodridge, “[t]o define the institution of
marriage by the characteristics of those to whom it always has been accessible,
in order to justify the exclusion of those to whom it never has been accessible, is
conclusory and bypasses the core question we are asked to decide.”205 As for the
assertion that expanding the definition of marriage would lead to the
elimination of all entrance requirements for marriage, proponents respond that

199. Elizabeth B. Cooper, Who Needs Marriage? Equality and the Role of the State, 8 J. L. & FAM.
STUD. 325, 344. See also Cynthia M. Davis, “The Great Divorce” of Government and Marriage: Changing
the Nature of the Gay Marriage Debate, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 795, 795 (2006).
200. Kindregan, supra note 7, at 37.
201. Id.
202. Culhane, supra note 1, at 1183.
203. Id.
204. See id. at 1183–84.
205. 798 N.E.2d at 972–73.
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expanding the definition to same-sex couples “does not open an unsealable rift
through which every candidate for marriage could then pour. If advocates of
polygamy wish to make the case for recognition of unions of more than two
persons, that issue should and must be addressed on its own terms.”206
Several commentators have argued that same-sex couples should not be
allowed to marry because homosexuals are “immoral, are incapable of
maintaining stable relationships and are prone to communicating disease.”207
Professor Lynn Wardle “asserts that homosexuals cannot enter successfully into
marital relationships grounded on fidelity in light of statistics that gay people,
particularly gay men, have many sexual partners, and that their intimate
relationships are of relatively short duration.”208 Allowing homosexuals to
marry, argues Professor Wardle, would denigrate the value of marriage in
society and would “undermine existing and future marriages of heterosexuals
or threaten family life.”209 Proponents of same-sex marriage disagree, of course,
with the premise that homosexuality is immoral per se210 and object to
stereotyping all gays and lesbians based on the conduct of some members of the
group.211 They suggest that such conduct may in fact be the natural result of
“the tremendous difficulty in sustaining relationships that receive almost no
support from society at large and that many people, including a number of
critics of same-sex marriage, actively will [these relationships] to fail.”212
The argument that homosexuality is immoral is based in part on religious
doctrine, specifically passages from the Bible that promote opposite-sex
relationships and condemn homosexuality.213 Proponents of same-sex marriage
have responded by asserting that government regulation of marriage should not
be based on religious doctrine because the Constitution requires the separation
of Church and State.214 However, some commentators have based the
immorality argument not on the Bible but on “natural law” principles.
The “natural law” position is mostly premised upon the notion of “the
natural sexual complementarity of men and women,”215 which results in “‘a
natural correspondence between the notion of marriage and the sexual coupling,
the merging of bodies, in the “unitive significance” of marriage.’”216
[Because] only the male/female pair can be sexually complementary, only such
a union can realize the true, unifying goods of marriage. . . . Members of the

206. Culhane, supra note 1, at 1184.
207. Sparling, supra note 1, at 196.
208. Id. at 201.
209. Id. at 198.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 203.
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., Genesis 2: 18–24; Leviticus 20:7–16, 20:22–27; Roman. 1:18–19, 1:22–32; and 1
Corinthians 6:1–3, 6:7–11.
214. See, e.g., Culhane, supra note 1, at 1187 (explaining that reliance on the Bible to resolve legal
questions would impermissibly further the establishment of religion).
215. Id. at 1203.
216. Id. (quoting Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on H.R. 3396 Before the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (testimony of Hadley Arkes, Ney Professor of Jurisprudence and
American Institutions, Amherst College) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 3396].
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same sex, by contrast, do not bring anything mutually complementary to sexual
activity, so that their activity could just as well have been realized by either of
the partners acting alone (i.e., masturbation).217

Professor Teresa Collett defines “complementarity” as the “innate desire
and unique capacity for union” of a man and a woman.218 She asserts that “[t]he
willing joinder of [the] inherent differences [between a man and a woman]
constitutes the mystery of marriage,” and that most heterosexual couples
achieve their greatest fulfillment through marriage.219 She argues that same-sex
couples could never achieve such fulfillment because “[w]hile same-sex unions
contain some diversity, in that they involve two unique and distinctive persons,
the differences are individual rather than inherent.”220 In contast to heterosexual
couples, “[t]he similarities in a same-sex union weaken the union in the same
manner that similarly formed pieces joined by adhesive are less durably
connected than interlocking pieces of the same material joined by the same
adhesive.”221
Professor Sparling challenges Professor Collett’s view of complementarity
by asserting that the concept can be understood to embrace a much broader
realm than merely the differences between the sexes. He observes that, “[g]iven
that Professor Collett is heterosexual, it is hardly surprising that she views the
male/female dichotomy as the catalyst that allows a man and a woman to
achieve so complete a union in marriage,”222 and argues that complementarity is
not so narrow a concept that it cannot be achieved by a same-sex couple in a
different sense.
For homosexuals, the spark that ignites and sustains our intimate relationships
is fired not by gender differences, or even by individual differences, but rather
by the force that emanates powerfully and mysteriously from the innate
qualities of our own sex. Because the sexual and spiritual desires of homosexual
couples spring from their celebration of likeness, rather than difference, they
experience total communion (the completeness that stands at the heart of
complementarity) through the unique bond of man to man or woman to
woman.
Thus, complementarity nurtures and sustains homosexual
relationships just as it does heterosexual ones; it simply flows from a different
source. For many homosexuals, like their heterosexual brothers and sisters, this
sense of being with one’s partner reaches its culmination in a relationship based
on love and commitment or, more precisely, marriage.223

Another argument commonly made by opponents to same-sex marriage is
that the primary purpose of marriage is procreation, and same-sex couples lack

217. Id. at 1206.
218. Teresa Stanton Collett, Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage: Asking for the Impossible?, 47 CATH. U.
L. REV. 1245, 1262 (1998).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Sparling, supra note 1, at 193.
223. Id.
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the biological capacity to reproduce.224 Proponents of same-sex marriage
respond that many heterosexual couples marry with no plan—and often with no
practical ability—to procreate. Examples include couples who are elderly or
those that are otherwise infertile.225 Goodridge similarly rejected this rationale
when it stated:
the state’s interest in regulating marriage is based on the traditional concept that
marriage’s primary purpose is procreation. This is incorrect. Our laws of civil
marriage do not privilege procreative heterosexual intercourse between married
people above every other form of adult intimacy and every other means of
creating a family. [The state’s marriage statute] contains no requirement that
the applicants for a marriage license attest to their ability or intention to
conceive children by coitus. Fertility is not a condition of marriage, nor is it
grounds for divorce. People who have never consummated their marriage, and
never plan to, may be and stay married.226

A particularly heated debate has also emerged over the effect that
legalizing same-sex marriage would have on children. Opponents of same-sex
marriage assert that
[t]he primary social function of marriage is rearing children. . . . Not only do
children need two parents; it also seems that ideally a child should have both a
mother and a father. . . . [I]t is reasonable to assume that children with both a
mother and a father will learn better how to live in a world composed of males
and females.”227

Professor Wardle writes that “[h]eterosexual marriage provides the best
environment into which children can be born and reared; the profound benefits
of dual-gender parenting to model intergender relations and show children how
to relate to persons of their own and the opposite gender are lost in same-sex
unions.”228 Proponents of same-sex marriage vehemently disagree with those
assertions. They cite to various studies that show “no appreciable difference
between children brought up in stable homosexual homes and those brought up
in stable heterosexual ones,”229 although there is wide disagreement over the
validity and proper interpretation of these studies.230 The court in Goodridge
similarly rejected the proposition that “confining marriage to opposite-sex
couples ensures that children are raised in the ‘optimal’ setting.”231 The court
took note of the state’s concession that same-sex couples can be excellent
parents, and stated that the exclusion of “same-sex couples from civil marriage

224. See, e.g., id. at 194; Culhane, supra note 1, at 1194; Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003) (rejecting the proposition that the primary purpose of marriage is
procreation).
225. See Sparling, supra note 1, at 194.
226. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961.
227. George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J.L. & POL. 581, 593–95 (1999).
228. Lynn D. Wardle, Legal Claims for Same-Sex Marriage: Efforts to Legitimate a Retreat From
Marriage by Redefining Marriage, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 735, 754–55 (1998).
229. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON 239 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997).
230. See id. at 239–69 (collection of articles and essays discussing the results and validity of
various studies investigating the effects on children of being raised by gay and lesbian parents).
231. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 962.
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will not make children of opposite-sex marriages more secure, but it does
prevent children of same-sex couples from enjoying the immeasurable
advantages that flow from the assurance of” the kind of stable family structure
associated with marriage.232
2. Arguments For Same-Sex Marriage and Rebuttals
Not all gays and lesbians embrace the concept of traditional marriage.
Andrew Sullivan writes that the American gay rights movement initially
rejected the concept of traditional marriage on grounds that it was an oppressive
and sexist institution; its “goal was to weaken the institution as a whole, to
subvert and undermine it, and to create alternative structures within which to
explore homosexual desire, love, and family.”233
The more recent trend has been to view marriage as the “linchpin of gay
civil rights,”234 and to be supportive of “the many lesbian and gay couples who
have sought the right to marry.”235
Professor John Culhane asserts that the case for same-sex marriage is
extraordinarily simple and clear.236 His position is that marriage enjoys almost
universal support from all of society; it is “encouraged by family, friends, and
community, financially supported by the government, and seen as a common
incidence of citizenship.”237 It is “recognized by religious groups as well as the
state. The Supreme Court’s recognition of the fundamental nature of the right to
marry reflects this view, which is as close to one of consensus as is likely in a
democratic society.”238 He argues that the Supreme Court has ruled that
prisoners, debtors, and interracial couples cannot be denied the right to marry,
and the same treatment should apply with regard to same-sex couples.239
According to Professor Culhane,
[b]asic equality demands that people who identify themselves as being of samesex orientation be permitted entry into the institution of marriage. By expressly
disallowing same-sex unions, the state devalues the lives of its gay and lesbian
citizens, denying their very citizenship in a vital respect that others take for
granted.240

Similar, sometimes even more emotional, appeals have been made for the
right of gays and lesbians to marry. Professor Sparling asserts that gay
marriages are in actuality no different than their heterosexual counterparts;
many gay and lesbian couples view their relationships as traditional marriages,
committing themselves for life to monogamy and mutual support.241 He argues

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 963–64.
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON, supra note 229, at 117.
Id.
Id.
See Culhane, supra note 1, at 1180.
Id. at 1180–81.
Id. at 1181.
Id.
Id.
See Sparling, supra note 1, at 189.
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that same-sex marriage is no different than opposite-sex marriage in the sense
that in both instances marriage
revitalizes the family through the inclusion of spouses who can create new
bonds and strengthen existing ties. These new sons and daughters-in-law may
enhance the family in a material way by bringing talents that the family has
heretofore lacked or by introducing the family to new opportunities for
advancement. Gay marriage, like different-sex marriage, can serve also as the
wellspring for sustaining the family by raising another generation of children.
Same-sex marriage carries great potential to enrich the family spiritually. The
gay marriage that is a model of love and commitment can serve as a powerful
example to other family members, whether they are heterosexual or
homosexual, married or unmarried, minors or of marriageable age. . . .
Advocates of same-sex marriage view marriage as a dynamic and vital
institution that is so deeply rooted in the human consciousness and the human
sense of family that it can and should incorporate all members of the human
race, homosexual as well as heterosexual, who share its ideals and accept its
duties and responsibilities. We deem the right to marry to be a basic human
right, one which should no more distinguish on the basis of sexual orientation
than on race or religion. To deny gay people the right to marry is to deny a part
of our humanity, to deprive us of the opportunity to achieve one of the
pinnacles of human fulfillment, and to forswear our ability to participate most
fully in family life. This denial brands us as alien to the human family when, in
fact, we are all in the family.242

Opponents of same-sex marriage disagree with this basic premise that
same-sex marriages are the functional equivalent of opposite-sex marriages.243
Professor Wardle argues that
[t]he nature of the relationship between two persons of the same sex is
fundamentally different than the heterosexual relationship that is marriage.
Certainly some other relationships can provide the setting for some type of
intimacy, other relationships can provide for economic support of individuals,
children can be propagated in other relationships, children can be raised in other
environments, and so forth. But no other companionate relationship provides
the same great potential for benefiting individuals and society as the
heterosexual covenant union we call marriage, and that is why committed
heterosexual unions are given the legal status of marriage.244

These conflicting arguments are advanced with equal passion and
commitment on both sides of the debate, and are impossible to reconcile. The
side one chooses depends upon individual beliefs and value systems. In the
arena of public opinion, opponents of same-sex marriage will generally win out
because of the overwhelming numerical advantage that opposite-sex couples
hold over their same-sex counterparts.245
242. Id. at 190–91.
243. See, e.g., Wardle, supra note 228.
244. Id. at 749.
245. This is because gays and lesbians represent a distinct minority of the population. A national
study published in 1993 showed that “only about 2% of the men surveyed had engaged in
homosexual sex and that 1% considered themselves exclusively homosexual.” Sparling, supra note 1,
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The more compelling argument in favor of same-sex marriage claims that
denying same sex couples the right to marry violates the U.S. Constitution
and/or the constitution of the applicable state.246 The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court adopted this view when it declared that “barring an individual
from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because
that person would marry a person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts
Constitution.”247 The court focused its constitutional analysis on the due process
and equal protection principles set forth in the Massachusetts Constitution.248
Central to the Goodridge court’s decision were the “enormous private and
social advantages” that marriage bestows on opposite-sex couples.249 The court
identified a substantial number of tangible and intangible benefits that flow
from marriage.250 Examples include: valuable property rights in the assets of the
other partner to the marriage; tax advantages; the right to hold title to property
in a tenancy by the entirety; enhanced homestead protection; inheritance rights;
medical insurance benefits; alimony rights and the equitable division of marital
property in the event of divorce; the right to bring claims for wrongful death
and the loss of consortium; presumptions of legitimacy and parentage of
children born to a married couple; and the application of predictable rules of
child custody, visitation, support, and other issues involving children in the
event of divorce.251 Children of married couples also receive special legal and
economic protections that are unavailable to children of unmarried parents.
Specifically, they benefit from the enhanced family stability and economic
security associated with marriage; the societal approval attached to having
married parents; and the greater accessibility to family-based federal and state
benefits that results from the legal presumption of parentage of children born in
wedlock.252
In his concurrence, Justice Greaney argued that the marriage statutes did
not violate the Massachusetts Constitution because they did not prevent gay
individuals from marrying; they merely prevented gay individuals from
marrying the person of their choice if that person was of the same sex. These
individuals were free to marry anyone who qualified under the statutes.253 The
majority rejected that argument, holding that the statutes violated the
Massachusetts Constitution because they prevented an individual desiring to
at 200 n.73. Of course, many heterosexual individuals support the right of same-sex couples to
marry.
246. A complete analysis of the constitutional issues with regard to denying persons of the same
sex the right to marry is beyond the scope of this article.
247. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
248. Id. at 953. The court noted that “[t]he Massachusetts Constitution is, if anything, more
protective of individual liberty and equality than the Federal Constitution; it may demand broader
protection for fundamental rights; and it is less tolerant of government intrusion into the protected
spheres of private life.” Id. at 948–49.
249. Id. at 954.
250. See id. at 955–57.
251. Id. at 955–56. See also Cooper, supra note 199, at 329–37 (2006) (discussing the substantial
benefits resulting from marriage, and stating that federal law alone accounts for over one thousand
rights).
252. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 956–57.
253. Id. at 975.
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marry a person of the same sex from marrying the person of his choice.254 To
support its reasoning, the Goodridge court cited to the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia,255 which held that a statutory bar to
interracial marriage violated the United States Constitution. Following the
Supreme Court’s rationale, the Goodridge court then stated that “the right to
marry means little if it does not include the right to marry the person of one’s
choice, subject to appropriate government restrictions in the interests of public
health, safety, and welfare.”256
The court’s reasoning in Goodridge is highly persuasive. Regardless of one’s
value system, personal beliefs and feelings regarding homosexuality and gay
marriage, it is extraordinarily difficult to make objective and persuasive counter
arguments to the constitutional basis for the court’s decision. Denying
substantial rights and benefits to a class of individuals based solely on their
choice of whom to marry would certainly seem to be constitutionally
impermissible.
Professor Wardle attempts to diminish the constitutional basis for same-sex
marriage by asserting that
homosexual behavior is not comparable to race as a basis for marriage
regulations. Race is unrelated to almost any legitimate purpose the law could
have for distinguishing between two persons, especially irrelevant to the
purposes of marriage; but homosexual behavior is directly related to the
fundamental purposes of marriage laws—that is, the regulation of sexual
behavior and protection of the mores that define the core identity, boundaries,
and basic structure for the moral order of a society. As General Colin Powell
puts it: “Skin color is a benign non-behavioral characteristic. Sexual orientation
is perhaps the most profound of human behavioral characteristics. Comparison
of the two is a convenient but invalid argument.”257

Professor Wardle thus argues that denying the rights and benefits of
marriage to a class of individuals based on their behavior, as opposed to
immutable characteristics like skin color, is constitutionally permissible. For this
argument even to be plausible, one would have to assume that the preference of
gays and lesbians to form relationships with members of their own sex is based
solely on their choice of how they wish to behave, rather than on biological
factors. Professor Wardle acknowledges that biological factors could possibly
contribute to homosexual behavior;258 but even if that is false, justifying the
denial of the right to marry a person of one’s choice and thus all the benefits that
marriage offers on the perceived behavior of a class of individuals is irrational.
No other class of individuals is denied the right to marry based on their
behavior. Professor Wardle is correct that the law should distinguish some
legally recognized relationships from others based on behavioral factors, but
any such distinction must not be the basis for affording greater rights and

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id. at 958.
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958.
Wardle, supra note 228, at 752–53.
Id.

MUSSELMAN__FMT1.DOC

74 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

1/21/2009 12:41:44 PM

Volume 16:37 2009

benefits to one class of relationships than any other such class. This issue will be
further explored in Part V of this article.
B. Responsive Proposals
Massachusetts and California are the only states thus far to allow same-sex
couples to marry pursuant to the general marriage law applicable to oppositesex couples. Various commentators have made a number of proposals they
believe would resolve the marriage debate, but would do so in some other
manner.
Some commentators propose creating a legally recognized status for samesex couples that would afford them all the rights and benefits that opposite-sex
couples already enjoy under the current marriage laws. That legally recognized
status would exist alongside the current legal status of marriage, but would be
called something other than marriage—such as “civil union.”259 This is the
approach taken, at least to some degree, in several states including Vermont,
New Jersey and Connecticut.260
Opinions regarding the effectiveness of the civil union approach are mixed.
Vermont enacted a civil union law that gives “same-sex couples all the rights,
benefits, and responsibilities of marriage. It treats same-sex couples as if they
were married in every respect, from inception to dissolution, withholding only
the word ‘marriage’ itself.”261 Although same-sex proponents in Vermont
supported enactment of the legislation, they now feel short-changed, perhaps in
part because of the subsequent adoption of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts
and California. As a result, they have renewed their fervor for the right to
marry pursuant to the general marriage law applicable to opposite-sex
couples.262 The principal criticism of civil unions is that they are viewed as
discriminatory and “an unconstitutional ‘separate-but-equal’ regime akin to the
Jim Crow laws struck down by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education
and other cases.”263 This view is rejected by respected constitutional law
scholars,264 but is at least indicative of the dissatisfaction of gay and lesbian
couples with a multi-tiered approach that creates one status of legally

259. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 5 (suggesting that couples could choose their form of legally
recognized relationship from several options, including civil union).
260. See supra notes 184, 187–188 and accompanying text.
261. Johnson, supra note 5, at 891.
262. See id. at 892.
263. Id. at 902.
264. Id. at 903–904. But see In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 400 (Cal. 2008) (holding that the
California legislature’s distinction between the use of the term marriage for the official legal
relationship of opposite-sex couples and domestic partnership for the official legal relationship of
same-sex couples unconstitutionally discriminated against same-sex couples based on sexual
orientation). See supra notes 194−198 and accompanying text. In addition, the Massachusetts
legislature, subsequent to the Goodridge decision, drafted a civil union law comparable to Vermont’s
and requested an advisory opinion from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court as to whether
the law satisfied the court’s constitutional concerns stated in Goodridge. The court replied that the
law created even more constitutional infirmities because it would relegate same-sex couples to
second-class status, and would deprive them of a “‘status that is specially recognized in society and
has significant social and other advantages.’” Johnson, supra note 5, at 904–905.
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recognized relationships applied solely to them and another status applied
solely to everyone else. Even those advocating for civil unions do so primarily
as a stepping-stone to full adoption of same-sex marriage.265
Professor Greg Johnson would go even further with this approach and
suggests that a couple could choose their form of legally recognized relationship
from a “‘menu of options.’”266
Some couples may want the handful of rights (such as health care benefits) and
limited commitment that domestic partnership offers. Others, who seek full
commitment but chafe at the stale trappings of marriage, may opt for civil
union. Many couples would undoubtedly prefer traditional marriage, and some
might even choose “covenant marriage.”267

Professors Drobac and Page have taken a different approach, proposing
that the legal status of marriage be entirely replaced with a new status bearing
different nomenclature and creating different rules, rights and obligations than
currently pertain to the status of marriage.268 They propose adoption of the
“Uniform Domestic Partnership Act,” which
would work (1) to secure the parentage and welfare of children (conceived of as
analogous to limited partners), (2) to create an efficient and unified domestic
economic enterprise, (3) to obtain legal rights and benefits based on a
partnership status, and (4) to reduce the financial costs and mutual acrimony
often associated with divorce.269

This new law would create four different types of domestic partnerships:
(1) the enduring domestic partnership, which is intended to continue until the
death of one of the partners, but may be terminated earlier and applies to
couples who intend to remain childless; (2) the provisional domestic
partnership, which lasts for only one year, is renewable annually if the partners
choose and is intended for couples who are not sure they want to commit to
each other for life; (3) the filial domestic partnership, which is intended for
couples who intend to raise children together; and (4) the caregiving domestic
partnership, which is intended for couples who agree to divide income-earning
and domestic caregiving tasks unequally.270 Any two adult persons may form
any of these partnerships, with the proviso that “no one person may be in more

265. See, e.g., id. at 906–908 (asserting that advances in gay and lesbian civil rights must begin
with the most basic rights and proceed to more advanced rights as the public becomes more
accustomed to antidiscrimination laws applicable to gays and lesbians, and becomes more accepting
of the gay and lesbian community).
266. Johnson, supra note 5, at 908.
267. Id.
268. Drobac & Page, supra note 4. This proposal is vaguely analogous to recommendations made
in 2002 by the American Law Institute, which suggests that “couples—gay and straight—in a
domestic partnership be treated the same as couples in a marriage for purposes of property division
and support upon dissolution of the relationship.” Johnson, supra note 5, at 910 (quoting Nancy D.
Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less: The ALI Domestic Partner Principles Are One Step in the Right
Direction, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 353, 354–58).
269. Drobac & Page, supra note 4, at 355.
270. Id. at 404–406.
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than one domestic partnership at a time.”271 The Act would provide specific
rules regarding formation of a partnership; rights and obligations of the partners
regarding the operation of a partnership; property rights with regard to
partnership property; rights and obligations with regard to children; fiduciary
obligations owed by partners to each other and to children; and termination of a
partnership.272 Drobac and Page maintain that this model would “facilitate
economic and strategic legal planning to benefit loving domestic partners, . . .
satisfy constitutional strictures[,] and leave marriage to the exclusive control of
the religious institutions.”273
Some commentators advocate the abolition of marriage altogether, or at
least abolition of the governmental regulation of marriage. Professor Daniel
Crane proposes that marriage be privatized wherein the state would step aside
and allow couples to define and regulate their marriages by private contract.274
His reasoning is theological; he argues that religious communities, by lobbying
for a restrictive legal definition of marriage as protection against the inclusion of
same-sex couples, “are implicitly acknowledging and confirming the state’s
right to dictate the definition and contours of marriage.”275 He concludes that
“marriage is the province of religious communities, not the state, and that
empowering the state to define marriage uniformly not only profanes a holy
institution but threatens the ultimate autonomy and authority of religious
communities with respect to marriage.”276
Professor Edward Zelinsky proposes that civil marriage be abolished:277
“The law should not define, regulate, or recognize marriage. Marriage—the
structured, publicly-proclaimed, communally-supported, relationship of mutual
commitment—should become solely a religious and cultural institution with no
legal definition or status.”278 He offers three reasons for deregulating marriage.
First, he asserts that marriage in our society has functionally changed and now
plays a different role than in the past. Because the legal doctrines governing
married couples are increasingly applied to both married and unmarried
couples, marriage is becoming unnecessary as a separate legal category.279
Second, he makes a law and economics argument and states that “abolishing
civil marriage would strengthen marriage by ending the government’s legal
monopoly in defining that institution; this would encourage a productive
competition among alternative versions of marriage.”280 He argues that once the
state removes itself from the business of recognizing, defining and regulating
marriage, various competitive forms of marriage will emerge and only the best
of such forms will survive.281 Traditional religions would have an equal
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id. at 402.
Id. at 406–17.
Id. at 402.
Crane, supra note 2, at 1259.
Id. at 1222.
Id.
Zelinsky, supra note 2, at 1163.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1163–64.
Id. at 1164.
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opportunity to convince couples that their form of marriage is the best.282 Third,
abolishing civil marriage would fully and finally resolve the debate with regard
to same-sex marriage.283
If some people believe that gay marriage is an ethical imperative while others
believe that it is a serious moral error, one or the other group will be
disappointed, if not aggrieved, by a single legal definition of marriage.
However, each group can promulgate its own definition of marriage in a world
with no civil marriage, a world in which the law does not define, recognize, or
regulate marriage.284

V. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
“The law that will work is merely the summing up in legislative form of the
moral judgment that the community has already reached.”
Woodrow Wilson, American President (1856–1924)

In spite of assertions to the contrary,285 the state has compelling reasons to
regulate relationships between couples:
[w]ithout question, civil marriage enhances the “welfare of the community.” It
is a “social institution of the highest importance.” Civil marriage anchors an
ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones. It is
central to the way the [state] identifies individuals, provides for the orderly
distribution of property, ensures that children and adults are cared for and
supported whenever possible from private rather than public funds, and tracks
important epidemiological and demographic data.286

Discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Zablocki v. Redhail,287 the
Goodridge court asserted that, “[a]s a practical matter, the State could not abolish
civil marriage without chaotic consequences.”288 This statement is particularly
poignant when considering Professor Wardle’s description of the official state
effort in Russia following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, which radically
transformed and de-privileged the institution of marriage.289 As quoted by
Professor Wardle in his article:
“Soviet social reconstruction was paid for in the coin of individual suffering and
broken families.” For some subgroups of Russian society, especially some
“peasants, family life often simply ceased to exist.” After the Revolution,
“moral decline and psychological excesses developed which ‘further deepened

282. See id. (asserting that traditional religions could prove to offer the most appealing choice
and thus emerge as the big winner).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See supra notes 274−280 and accompanying text, arguing for the deregulation of marriage by
the state.
286. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003).
287. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
288. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 957 n.14.
289. Wardle, supra note 3. See also supra notes 56−77 and accompanying text.
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the disorganization of the family . . . and [created] economic hardships,’ and in
marital family relations” reduced the family to a condition lower than had
“existed in Tsarist Russia.”290

Which relationships to include in the regulatory scheme of civil marriage is
the object of debate. It is not possible to reach a consensus with regard to a
universal definition of a legally recognized relationship that would replace the
current status of marriage. At the same time, both sides of the marriage debate
appear woefully unhappy with the current state of affairs. Regardless of
whether the status of marriage is modified in some particular way or remains
the same, a substantial number of people are going to feel that their personal
sense of morals, ethics and beliefs have been violently offended, and are going
to be significantly unhappy with the result. If effective change is to be achieved,
it will have to be based on a multi-faceted approach that provides for more than
one legally recognized relationship that couples may enter, each with different
requirements but offering the same rights and benefits.
This article proposes an approach that defines two legally recognized
relationships: first, for opposite-sex couples desiring a traditional marriage, a
definition termed “marriage” that comports with the covenant marriage laws
enacted in Louisiana, Arizona and Arkansas, but with the modifications
proposed by this article, as discussed above;291 second, for all couples, whether
same-sex or opposite-sex, a definition termed “domestic partnership” (or “civil
union” or any other acceptable term other than “marriage”) that generally
follows the current system that we now call marriage. Both relationships would
be entitled to the same rights and benefits. The distinction between the two
relationships would be confined to their respective legal definitions.292
A. Same-Sex Couples Have Rights Too
The arguments over same-sex marriage are advanced with equal passion
and commitment on both sides of the debate, and are impossible to reconcile.
The side one chooses depends upon individual beliefs and value systems. But a
compelling argument can be made that denying persons of the same sex the
right to form legal relationships that are entitled to the same rights and benefits
as legal relationships opposite-sex couples may form violates the U.S.
Constitution and/or the constitution of the applicable state.293 Regardless of
one’s value system, personal beliefs and feelings regarding homosexuality and
gay marriage, it is extraordinarily difficult to objectively and persuasively argue
that it is constitutionally permissible to deny substantial rights and benefits to a
class of individuals based solely on their choice of with whom they form a
legally recognized relationship.

290. Wardle, supra note 3, at 490–91 (quoting H. KENT GEIGER, THE FAMILY IN SOVIET RUSSIA
(1968)).
291. See supra notes 78−176 and accompanying text.
292. New Jersey has a similar structure currently in place. Opposite-sex couples may choose
between marriage and domestic partnership, while same-sex couples are limited to domestic
partnership. See Kindregan, supra note 7, at 39.
293. See supra notes 246−258 and accompanying text.
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Constitutional requirements should not negate the adoption of a multifaceted approach that defines different legally recognized relationships that are
available to some couples and not to others.294 The same state-conferred rights
and benefits must, of course, be available to each type of relationship that is
legally recognized. Some of the states that have adopted civil union statutes
have done exactly that.295 This proposal would afford the same rights and
benefits to both types of legally recognized relationships.
B. Public Policy Perspective
From a public policy standpoint, the conundrum is determining the basis
for the different relationships that a state will legally recognize and to whom
they will apply. Each legally defined relationship must be justified on the basis
of public policy; otherwise, there is no reason for that relationship to have a
legal definition different from any other legally recognized relationship.
The problem with the states’ adoption of civil unions or domestic
partnerships that have the same rights and benefits as marriage is that they have
distinguished those relationships from marriage solely on the basis of sexual
orientation. The public policy justification reflected an attempt to award the
rights and benefits of marriage to same-sex couples while appeasing those who
believed that same-sex relationships should not be legally recognized in any
form. Although laudable for its valiant effort to find middle ground in the
marriage debates, distinguishing legally recognized relationships based solely
on sexual orientation fails to recognize that not all opposite-sex relationships are
functionally equivalent to each other. One of the chief concerns about legally
recognizing same-sex marriage, or even recognizing marriage alternatives such
as civil unions, is the denigration in value of marriage in society and its ultimate
destruction as an institution.296 As discussed in Part III.A of this article,
opposite-sex couples have been doing a fine job of devaluing marriage all by
themselves; they need no assistance from same-sex couples in accomplishing
that result.297
Two legally recognized relationships are defined under this proposal: one
(termed “marriage”) for opposite-sex couples desiring a traditional marriage,
and another for all other couples, whether opposite-sex or same-sex. One
principal objective of this approach is to elevate “marriage” to a much more
honored and valued status than it currently enjoys in our society while
294. But see In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). See supra notes 194−198 and
accompanying text. In addition, the Massachusetts legislature, subsequent to the Goodridge decision,
drafted a civil union law comparable to Vermont’s and requested an advisory opinion from the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court as to whether the law satisfied the court’s constitutional
concerns stated in Goodridge. The court replied that the law created even more constitutional
infirmities because it would relegate same-sex couples to second-class status, and would deprive
them of a “‘status that is specially recognized in society and has significant social and other
advantages.’” Johnson, supra note 5, at 904–905.
295. See, e.g., supra note 181 and accompanying text (describing the adoption by the Vermont
legislature of a civil union statute that provides the same legal benefits to same-sex couples that
marriage provides to opposite-sex couples).
296. See generally supra notes 202−232 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 30–69 and accompanying text.
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recognizing that not all opposite-sex couples view marriage in that regard.
Those couples along with same-sex couples would be entitled to enter into a
legally recognized relationship that has the same rights and benefits as
marriage, but very different obligations and characteristics based on the
definitions applicable to each relationship.
This proposal distinguishes between these two legally recognized
relationships not solely on the basis of sexual orientation, but primarily on their
functional distinctions and qualities and the purposes for which the couples
desire to form them. For example, couples desiring a traditional marriage are
intent on forming a life-long relationship that will involve child-bearing and
parenting. The covenant marriage laws, with the modifications proposed by
this article,298 will assist a couple in accomplishing those objectives.
C. What Makes Marriage So Special?
What is the public policy justification for treating marriage as a separate,
legally recognized relationship different from all others? Marriage has long held
an esteemed and privileged status in our society; the U.S. Supreme Court, in
Griswold v. Connecticut,299 described marriage as
a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to
the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not
causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as
any involved in our prior decisions.300

Of course, marriage has changed over time; “[f]or most of human history,
marriage and kin were obvious, urgent, personal necessities.”301 Marriage and
family were essential to survival. Family and marital loyalty was an extremely
important concept, and the decisions of young people to marry and bear
children “was not just a private, personal taste, but an urgent necessity for the
family and community.”302 Much has changed in our society in recent decades.
“Today, government and the market have taken over the family’s onceundisputed roles as the prime source of key goods; [that is], wealth production
and social insurance,”303 resulting in a radical change in the importance of the
family to society and to the individual.304 So, is the Griswold Court’s noble
description of marriage simply an outdated notion belonging to a bygone era?
Has the necessity for treating marriage as “intimate to the degree of being
sacred” gone the way of the buggy whip, so that we can now simply treat all

298. See supra note 78–176 and accompanying text.
299. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
300. Id. at 486. The Court was speaking of marriage in the traditional sense; i.e., between a man
and a woman.
301. Maggie Gallagher, If Marriage is Natural, Why Is Defending It So Hard? Taking Up the
Challenge to Marriage in the Pews and the Public Square, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 409, 412 (2006).
302. Id.
303. Id. at 413.
304. Id.
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relationships between any two persons the same, at least for purposes of legal
recognition and regulation?
Noted authors have devoted much of their scholarship to the repudiation
of that proposition. Professor Wardle asserts that “historically marriage has
always referred to the union of a man and a woman in a unique relationship of
commitment and intimacy. . . This is one of the great constants in human
history—constant across time and across cultures.”305 While legal definitions
evolve,
the union of a man and a woman is part of the very nature and reality of the
marriage relationship itself. . . . Certainly some other relationships can provide
the setting for some type of intimacy, other relationships can provide for
economic support of individuals, children can be propagated in other
relationships, children can be raised in other environments, and so forth. But no
other companionate relationship provides the same great potential for
benefiting individuals and society as the heterosexual covenant union we call
marriage . . . .

...
. . . [I]n some societies and eras, some other companionate or sexual
relationships have been tolerated, accommodated, permitted, or even
encouraged, but those other relationships were recognized to be something
different, not marriages. The legal status of marriage has been reserved
exclusively for special covenant heterosexual unions because those unions are
unique and uniquely beneficial. The right to enter that unique relationship is
now generally recognized to be one of the basic human rights because that
relationship is unique and uniquely important to humanity.306

Maggie Gallagher has focused particularly on the benefits that marriage
offers to children, and the benefits to society that result when children
prosper.307 She asserts that “when mothers and fathers fail to make reasonably
decent marriages in which to raise their children, most children suffer, and
many children are damaged.”308 Children of unmarried parents are exposed to
risks that include “poverty, suicide, mental illness, physical illness, infant
mortality, lower educational attainment, juvenile delinquency and conduct
disorder, adult criminality, early unwed parenthood, lower life expectancy, and
distant relations with both mothers and fathers.”309 These risks cannot be
entirely controlled simply by the presence in the home of another adult who is
not the child’s biological parent. Research on the effects of marriage on children
demonstrates
that family structure matters for children, and the family structure that helps
children the most is a family headed by two biological parents in a low-conflict

305. Wardle, supra note 228, at 748.
306. Id. at 749–50.
307. See generally Gallagher, supra note 301, at 417–22 (asserting that marriage exists in some form
in every society because men and women are naturally and powerfully attracted to sex, sex makes
babies, society needs babies to survive, and babies need parents who will nurture and care for them).
308. Id. at 420.
309. Id. at 420–21.
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marriage. Children in single-parent families, children born to unmarried
mothers, and children in stepfamilies or cohabiting relationships face higher
risks of poor outcomes. . . . There is thus value for children in promoting strong,
stable marriages between biological parents.310

According to thirteen leading family scholars, “[m]arriage is an important
social good, associated with an impressively broad array of positive outcomes
for children and adults alike. . . . [W]hether American society succeeds or fails
in building a healthy marriage culture is clearly a matter of legitimate public
concern.”311
It can certainly be persuasively argued that the representations quoted
above are purely a matter of opinion and cannot be proven with any degree of
accuracy. Indeed, Part IV of this article discusses the counter-arguments made
by proponents of same-sex marriage particularly in response to Professor
Wardle’s assertions. Regardless of which side of this debate one chooses, there
is a much more compelling reason for separating marriage from all other
relationships and giving it a separate legal status.
Presumably it is incontestable that the relationships that provide the most
benefit to individuals and stability to society are those that are engaged in by
couples who are deeply committed to each other for life and agree to monogamy
and to mutual support of each other emotionally, physically and financially. If
the relationship involves or produces children, the individual family members
and society as a whole will benefit most if those children are properly parented
and nurtured, and receive the necessary care and resources to avoid the risks of
maladjustment. Professor Wardle uses sexual orientation as the dividing line,
asserting that only heterosexual unions can provide those benefits, but his use of
the term “heterosexual covenant union” reminds us that not all heterosexual
marriages are functionally equivalent.312 Many heterosexual marriages under
the current system are not “covenant unions” by any stretch, and fall far short of
the kind of relationship that provides those benefits assumed by Professor
Wardle. Furthermore, attaining the current legal status of marriage requires
nothing more than a marriage license. There is no assurance that couples
wishing to attain that status have any idea what it entails, much less understand
the concept of a “covenant union.” Simply keeping same-sex couples out of the
club does nothing to further the objective of strengthening marriage for the
benefit of society.
One of the principal goals of this proposal is to elevate marriage to a much
more honored and valued status than it currently enjoys in our society. This
goal will be achieved by separating marriage from all other relationships and
defining it by use of the covenant marriage laws, with the modifications
proposed by this article. The premarital counseling provisions, in particular,
will better prepare couples for the realities of marriage and the issues they will
inevitably be forced to deal with. That preparation will provide them with a
greater chance that the marriage will be successful, and allow them to build a
stronger foundation for their marriage prior to the ceremony. Ultimately, the
310.
311.
312.

Id. at 420.
Id. at 421.
Wardle, supra note 228, at 749.
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number of marriages that end up in divorce will be reduced. Furthermore,
appropriate premarital counseling will force couples who are ill-suited for each
other to come face to face with their differences, and possibly decide to avoid
altogether entering into a problematic marriage that might eventually end in
divorce.
The proposal defines marriage to include only opposite-sex couples. It will
perhaps be criticized for that reason, but there exists no rational basis for any
such criticism. As a practical matter, inclusion of same-sex couples in the
definition of marriage would surely result in more of the same vigorous debate
we have suffered for the past several decades, with no resolution possible. More
importantly, if proponents of same-sex marriage have been truthful in
advancing their side of the debate, their principal and most compelling
argument is that denying persons of the same sex the right to marry violates the
U.S. Constitution and/or the constitution of the applicable state. This proposal
arguably solves the constitutional issue by including same-sex couples in the
definition of domestic partnership, which would be entitled to the same rights
and benefits as marriage.313
Some proponents of same-sex marriage, however, have gone further with
this issue and argued that the right to marry is a basic human right. By denying
same-sex couples the right to marry, “the state devalues the lives of its gay and
lesbian citizens, denying their very citizenship in a vital respect that others take
for granted.”314 Professor Sparling makes an even more emotional appeal. “To
deny gay people the right to marry is to deny a part of our humanity, to deprive
us of the opportunity to achieve one of the pinnacles of human fulfillment, and
to forswear our ability to participate most fully in family life.”315 These
statements fuel suspicions long held by opponents of same-sex marriage; that
gays and lesbians have become intransigent with regard to insisting that they be
included in the definition of marriage because what they really want is the
acceptance and approval by society of their sexual orientation.316 This rationale
has sometimes been acknowledged by gay and lesbian authors. Paula Ettelbrick
313. But see In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). See supra notes 195−198 and
accompanying text. In addition, the Massachusetts legislature, subsequent to the Goodridge decision,
drafted a civil union law comparable to Vermont’s and requested an advisory opinion from the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court as to whether the law satisfied the court’s constitutional
concerns stated in Goodridge. The court replied that the law created even more constitutional
infirmities because it would relegate same-sex couples to second-class status, and would deprive
them of a “‘status that is specially recognized in society and has significant social and other
advantages.’” Johnson, supra note 5, at 904–905 (quoting Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802
N.E. 2d 565 (Mass. 2004)). If the Supreme Court of California and the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court are correct on the constitutional law point, I would make the same proposal, but
amend it to include same-sex couples in the definition of marriage as well as domestic partnership. I
would make that concession only if required to do so because of the constitutional issue. I do not
believe, as a matter of public policy, that they should be so included, for reasons stated in this
section of this article.
314. Culhane, supra note 1, at 1181.
315. Sparling, supra note 1, at 191.
316. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 227, at 617 (asserting that a segment of those supporting gay
marriage reject domestic partnership and civil union laws, even though they provide the same
benefits as marriage, because what those supporters really want is the honor, respect and social
approval associated with traditional marriage).
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writes that “[m]arriage provides the ultimate form of acceptance for personal,
intimate relationships in our society . . . . Given the imprimatur of social and
personal approval that marriage provides, it is not surprising that some lesbians
and gay men among us would look to legal marriage for self-affirmation.”317
But, she insightfully concludes that “[w]e must not fool ourselves into believing
that marriage will make it acceptable to be gay or lesbian. We will be liberated
only when we are respected and accepted for our differences and the diversity
we provide to this society.”318
Another suspicion long held by opponents of same-sex marriage is that
gays and lesbians desire the right to marry for the purpose of destroying the
institution from within. In its early years, the Gay Rights Movement supported
this view: “Marriage, the argument ran, was an oppressive, sexist, and
inherently heterosexual institution. The movement’s goal was to weaken the
institution as a whole, to subvert and undermine it, and to create alternative
structures within which to explore homosexual desire, love, and family.”319
Professors Culhane and Sparling will perhaps still feel devalued and
excluded by this proposal of two legally recognized relationships, or perhaps
they will be satisfied by the inclusion of same-sex couples in the definition of
domestic partnership. In any event, they will be unable to make a valid
argument that the proposal somehow violates their constitutional rights.
There is another, more intangible reason this proposal will strengthen
marriage and elevate it to a more honored and valued status. A significant
proportion of heterosexual couples will, for various reasons, be attracted to
marriage rather than domestic partnership. They may be attracted to the more
rigid requirements for entering that relationship and the improved chances of
success that those requirements provide, or they may be attracted to the
elevated status society may award to marriage over domestic partnership.
Couples may decide on marriage because of pressure from family or from their
future partners, or encouragement from their religious leaders. They may
choose marriage simply because it is the relationship couples in our society have
traditionally chosen since the beginning of our culture. For whatever reason,
there will be a significant number of heterosexual couples who choose the
marriage option.
A substantial number of people in our society consider themselves actively
religious,320 and most of those couples will choose marriage because of these
religious beliefs. The vast majority of Americans who are members of an
organized religion belong to Judeo-Christian denominations321 and believe that
marriage is created by God. Catholicism views marriage as a sacrament;322 one
317.

Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in SAME SEX MARRIAGE: PRO
118–19 (Andrew Sullivan, ed., 1997).
Id. at 124.
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON, supra note 229, at 117. See also Dent, supra note 227, at

AND CON 118,

318.
319.
617.
320. Anthony R. Benedetto, The Impact on “The Vanishing Trial” If People of Faith Were Faithful to
Religious Principles of Settling Disputes Without Litigation, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 253, 266–67 (2006).
321. Id.
322. Randy Lee, Finding Marriage Amidst a Sea of Confusion: A Precursor to Considering the Public
Purposes of Marriage, 43 CATH. LAW. 339, 350 (2004).
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author cites Pope Pius XI for the proposition that “[m]arriage is the promise to
love just one other human being in the way that God loves everyone.”323
Christians of all denominations adhere to the teachings of Saint Paul. In his
letter to the Ephesians, Paul gives the following instructions to wives and
husbands:
Wives, submit to your husbands as to the Lord. For the husband is the head of
the wife as Christ is the head of the church, his body, of which he is the Savior.
Now as the church submits to Christ, so also wives should submit to their
husbands in everything.
Husbands, love your wives, just as Christ loved the church and gave himself up
for her to make her holy . . . . In this way, husbands ought to love their wives as
their own bodies. He who loves his wife loves himself. . . . “For this reason a
man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two will
become one flesh.”324

Contrary to frequent interpretation, what Paul is describing in these verses
is not a relationship where the husband and wife each pursue their own
personal fulfillment and satisfaction of their own personal needs, or a one-sided
relationship where the wife submits to the authority of the husband and the
husband gives nothing of value to the wife; instead, Paul is describing a
mutually loving, supportive, Godly, sacrificial, spiritual, service-centered
relationship, where both spouses focus all of their energies and gifts to satisfying
the needs of each other.
When a significant number of deeply religious couples choose the marriage
option under this proposal and experience much stronger marriages because of
the counseling and other required provisions, society will have a successful
model to which other couples can aspire. If marriage becomes a highly
successful, rewarding, and mutually enjoyable institution in our society, more
couples will be interested in choosing that option, and society will reap the
benefits resulting from a greater number of stable relationships and stronger
families. To borrow Professor Zelinsky’s reasoning, if more than one option
exists for couples to form a legally recognized relationship, “a productive
competition” will ensue. Traditional religions will have an equal opportunity to
convince couples that their form of relationship is the best.325
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no question that both the concept and practice of marriage in
America have dramatically evolved over the last half-century or so. The divorce
rate has exponentially increased to the extent that approximately half of all
marriages end in divorce;326 both men and women are increasingly delaying
marriage or rejecting it altogether; and more than one-third of births are to
unmarried mothers. These factors have all contributed to the notion that the

323.
324.
325.
326.

Gallagher, supra note 301, at 429.
Ephesians 5:22–31.
Zelinsky, supra note 2, at 1163–64.
Wardle, supra note 32.
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institution of marriage in the United States is “withering away,” resulting in
peril to families and to society.
In addition, a prodigious debate has erupted over the meaning of
“marriage” and its role in society. One side desires an expansion of the
definition of marriage, and the other desires the restrictive definition already
currently in place in most jurisdictions. The camp in favor of expansion is most
particularly interested in including same-sex couples in the definition of
marriage, or at least creating a parallel relationship status for same-sex couples
that would exist alongside marriage and would confer all the same rights and
benefits. The restrictive camp is adamantly opposed to including same-sex
couples in the definition of marriage, and most members are opposed to
creating any other type of legal status for same-sex couples that is similar in any
way to marriage. Each side of this debate is equally convinced of the merits of
its arguments, making them vigorously with legal, ethical, moral and religious
overtones.
Various responses and proposals have been made to address the concerns
that many have expressed regarding their perception that the institution of
marriage is in decline, and to offer compromise in hopes of resolving the
convoluted, often bitter, marriage debate. Three states have enacted covenant
marriage laws, which establish a second tier of marriage that couples can choose
if they desire. Covenant marriages have very stringent entrance and exit
requirements, and require a couple to acknowledge that they agree to be
married for life. Some commentators have proposed replacing the legal status of
marriage with a new status bearing different nomenclature, and others have
suggested abolishing marriage, or at least the regulation of marriage by
government.
No consensus has been reached regarding a universal definition of a legally
recognized relationship that would replace the current status of marriage, yet no
one seems satisfied with the status quo. It is likely not possible to define
marriage in any single way that would not violate the personal sense of morals,
ethics and beliefs of a significant portion of the population. Resolution of this
issue will require a multi-faceted approach that provides for more than one
legally recognized relationship that couples may enter, each with different
requirements but offering the same rights and benefits.
This article proposes an approach that defines two legally recognized
relationships: first, for opposite-sex couples desiring a traditional marriage, a
definition termed “marriage” that comports with the covenant marriage laws
enacted in Louisiana, Arizona and Arkansas, but with the modifications
proposed by this article, as discussed above; and second, for all couples,
whether same-sex or opposite-sex, a definition termed “domestic partnership”
(or “civil union” or any other acceptable term other than “marriage”) that
generally follows the current system that we now call marriage. Both
relationships would be entitled to the same rights and benefits. The distinction
between the two relationships would be confined to their respective legal
definitions.
As discussed above, it is extraordinarily difficult to objectively and
persuasively argue that it is constitutionally permissible to deny substantial
rights and benefits to a class of individuals, based solely on their choice of with
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whom they form a legally recognized relationship. This proposal arguably
solves that constitutional issue by including same-sex couples in the definition
of domestic partnership, which would be entitled to the same rights and benefits
as marriage.
In addition, this proposal elevates marriage to a much more honored and
valued status than it currently enjoys in our society by separating marriage from
all other relationships, and defining it by use of the covenant marriage laws,
with the modifications proposed by this article. If marriage becomes a highly
successful, rewarding and mutually enjoyable institution in our society, more
couples will be interested in choosing that option, and society as a whole will
reap the benefits resulting from a greater number of stable relationships and
stronger families.

